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ABSTRACT
Over-currents are known to be the dominant cause of power system component failures or
deterioration from full functionality. Some of these effects may remain unknown and could later
result in catastrophic failures of the entire or large portions of the system. There are plenty of
devices/methods available to limit the undesirable consequences of the over-current events. These
devices/methods have great impact on system reliability by reducing stress on power system
components and increasing their useful lifetime. Due to the importance of the subject, there is
tremendous need to analyze and compare these devices/methods in terms of reliability. However,
few researches have been reported on analyzing reliability impacts of these devices. Reported
studies, in the meantime, appear to have investigated these effects qualitatively rather than
quantitatively. This is mainly due to lack of a mathematical model to study the direct impacts of
over-current values on system reliability. The main stream of reliability calculations are normally
based on statistical measures of system outages rather than electrical parameters such as overcurrent values.
Over-currents usually appear in two common forms of fault currents and overload currents. Fault
Current Limiters (FCL) and protection devices are commonly used to limit the impact of fault
currents. FCL’s limit the magnitude of fault currents and protection devices limit the exposure
time of the component to the fault current and therefore have great impact on increasing the
lifetime of the components. Overloads, on the other hand, have smaller magnitudes than those of
fault currents but can still be destructive because of normally much longer exposure times.
Overcoming overload problems usually requires control strategies such as generation rescheduling
xix

and/or load shedding, and optimized usage of existing assets. Using Demand Response (DR)
programs are one of the most effective ways of reducing overload burdens on the power system.
In this dissertation, simulation models are developed and used to determine the effect of FCL on
reducing the magnitude of fault currents. Various case studies will be performed to calculate the
effectiveness of FCL’s in real power system applications. Then, security/dependability studies on
the protection systems will be performed to analyze and calculate their effectiveness in reducing
exposure times to fault currents. Based on the calculated indices, proper selection of protection
schemes can be made based on the desired level of dependability/security.
In the next part of the work, a mathematical model is developed to calculate the effect of fault
current magnitude and duration on the reliability and asset management. Using the developed
model and results of the earlier sections of this research work, the impact of protection systems
and FCL devices on reliability and asset management programs are quantitatively calculated and
compared. The results from such studies will assist in maintenance planning and in proper selection
of the fault current limiting devices with regards to desired reliability and asset management
programs.
DR programs are introduced and modeled in this dissertation as an effective tool in reducing
overload burdens on power system components. Using the developed mathematical model, DR
programs are studied and compared in terms of reliability improvement that they provide by
preventing unnecessary increase in the component failure rates.

xx

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Power systems around the world are changing from the management and operating points
of view and there is a strong tendency towards separating generation from the primary
transmission grid. In this new deregulated and competitive environment, the power utility
responsible for operating the primary grid loses control over the sitting and scheduling of
generating units. This has the consequence that considerable attention would be devoted to
the generation expansion in areas where previously generation deficiencies existed.
Growth in the generation of electrical energy particularly in the form of connecting
independent power producers (IPP’s) to the grid and an increased interconnection of the
power grids lead to higher fault currents which have not been included in the original long
term planning forecasts. One of the consequences of this growth is that the network and
the associated equipment reach or even exceed their limits with respect to the over- current
withstand capabilities. At the same time, consumers request higher level of reliability
which can be achieved by providing parallel transmission facilities. This will, however,
raise the fault current level which in turn imposes a severe burden on circuit breakers and
power system apparatuses. These problems are not avoidable due to the over-current events
that may occur anywhere and anytime in the power network. The challenge of the future
network designs will be to face these challenges by the application of new and effective
technologies in the network [1] .
Over-currents mainly appear in two common forms of short circuit and overload. Short
circuit currents (also called fault currents) are known to be the dominant cause of power
1

system component failures or deterioration from full functionality [2] . Some of these
effects may remain unknown and could later lead to cascading failures of the entire or large
portions of the system. It is a common practice to use Fault Current Limiters (FCL’s) and
protection devices to eliminate undesirable impacts of short circuit currents. They do so by
reducing the magnitude and exposure time to fault currents.
While short circuit can cause catastrophes by posing huge amount of stress and mechanical
forces in a very short amount of time, overloads can also raise serious issues due to much
longer periods of exposure. Overcoming overloads problems usually requires control
strategies such as generation rescheduling and/or load shedding, and optimized usage of
existing assets. Smart grids have made it a priority to address customer interactions in
forms of Demand Response (DR) as a powerful tool to provide load/generation balance
throughout the peak/off-peak hours, in order to reduce the overload burdens in the power
system. DR is defined as: "Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time,
or to incentive payments". There are several DR programs based on different price
patterns/incentive payments designed to improve power system operation. These programs
allow for better usage of existing assets, by reducing energy consumption during peak
hours and increasing it in non-peak hours.
Over-current effects are not limited to the region of exposure as they could influence the
performance of remote equipment as well. The effects of over-currents include mechanical
2

stress, undesirable overheating, deterioration of insulation, etc. Despite the importance of
increased over current levels on power system operation and components, few
investigations have been reported on the evaluation of the effects of over-current on
reliability [2]. Reported studies, in the meantime, appear to have investigated these effects
qualitatively rather than quantitatively and suggesting a method to model them. Due to lack
of proper models that consider the direct effect of overcurrent on failure rates, destructive
impacts of increased over-current levels on power system reliability and the potential
damages and resulting risk of cascading failures have been ignored. Due to their destructive
nature, however, the recognition of these effects on component failure rates and on system
reliability cannot and should not be underestimated.
State of the Art of the Subject
Current literature on reliability analysis involving FCL and protection devices are majorly
with regard to the role of these devices in reducing outages. This is due to the fact that
current reliability evaluation techniques (such as failure modes and effects analysis) usually
rely on number and duration of system outages to calculate system availability indices [3].
There are numerous studies that show the reliability improvements due to using FCL’s [410]. Many studies have been carried out concerning different type of FCL’s [4], their
structural designs [5], [6], and their impact on static and dynamic behavior of faulted
systems [7] , [8]. In [9] , no particular substation configurations are assumed, and the FCL’s
are located in distribution networks. [10] Has suggested a Markov model for operation of
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fault current limiters and has calculated reliability indices based on system outages at each
state of the Markov model. These works are all based on outage reductions that these
devices offer. Chapter four of this dissertation shows some of the application studies and
reliability calculations of FCL’s using existing techniques.
There are also several works done to study reliability improvements due to protection
systems [17-21]. [11] has studied the impact of protection system on power system
reliability using a new method of finding cut-sets. These cut-sets are various paths that lead
to the system partial/total outages. [12] and [13] have studied the effects of protection
system failures on power system reliability. These failures are failure to operate when
protection system is required to operate and malfunction when it is not required to operate.
Again due to the nature of the existing reliability methods, these calculations are all based
on the ability of protection system in preventing power system outages.
In case of overloads, reliability calculations become more complicated. Since there are
usually no immediate outages following the overload events, there are no practical ways to
capture the reliability impact of overload currents in existing reliability evaluation
methods. As a result, overloads are being ignored in almost all standard reliability
calculations.
Problem with the Existing Approach
While outage reduction is a very important benefit of using FCL’s, and allows us to
calculate improvements in reliability indices such as “Expected Energy Not Supplied”
4

(EENS), “Expected Load Not Supplied”, (ELNS), Capacity Outage Probability Table [14],
etc.; it wouldn’t picture the entire story. In most cases, current limitation devices improve
reliability without necessarily preventing outages. This becomes evident by looking at the
works that use failure mode and effect analysis to calculate reliability indices, and seeing
that in many cases using these devices eliminates just a few number of cases leading to
major outages [15].
Using an outage-based approach, gives misleading results in case of protection devices as
well. Protection devices are usually idle during the normal operation of power systems.
Therefore in existing models, in order to assign a meaningful reliability improvement due
to a protection system, it must be capable of preventing major outages [16]. However, a
major part of the system reliability due to the protection system, is in it continuously
eliminating stress on the power system equipment regardless of having/not having major
outages [1]. On the other hand, speed of action and the relative timing incorporated in
various protection schemes have a profound impact on power system reliability that can’t
be fully evaluated using outage-based approaches [17]. Therefore, existing techniques
underestimate the reliability enhancement caused by protection systems.
It is known that equipment that are more frequently exposed to short circuit conditions are
more likely to fail later as a result of such stresses. In terms of reliability, the failure rate
of these equipment will increase rapidly with time [17]. The increment in failure rate is
obviously a function of frequency and severity of the faults. [18] has proposed an approach
5

that considers a coefficient for failure rate reduction caused by installing FCL’s, without
discussing the details and modeling how failure rate is actually decreased. These reliability
impacts can not be captured using existing reliability evaluation techniques [1], [17].
As stated earlier, impact of overload currents on system reliability calculations are mostly
ignored due to their less sever role in system outages. As a result, role of DR programs to
alleviate overload conditions are not studied to their full potentials in reliability literatures.
[19] is the only work that has addressed the impact of overloads on power system
reliability. According to [19], overloads can combine with scheduled outages of other
components leading to major power system outages. The truth is that the impact of overload
currents, as suggested by [19], are less frequent compared to the actual continuous stresses
that overloads pose on power system components on daily basis, causing a huge increase
in their failure rates.
Contribution of this work
In this dissertation, the author proposes, develops, and presents an analytical method that
models the direct impact of over currents magnitude and exposure times on the failure rate
of power systems components. Unlike the existing reliability models that rely heavily on
number/duration of system outages, the authors approach provides a mathematical model
for calculating the impact of fault currents on system reliability. In case of fault currents,
the new method enables us to directly quantify negative effects of different fault current
values, rather than studying the system outages caused by those fault currents. Using the
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proposed method, impacts of fault current limitation techniques on reliability improvement
and increasing useful lifetime of power system components are calculated in this
dissertation. Also guidelines are provided to show how to use the developed model to
derive practical maintenance schedules for the affected components.
There are several DR programs based on different price patterns/incentive payments
designed to improve power system operation. These programs allow for better usage of
existing assets by reducing the energy consumption during peak hours and increasing it in
non-peak hours. Using the developed mathematical model introduced in above, the
reliability impact of DR programs in reducing overload current levels are calculated and
compared.
Another major contribution of this dissertation is in modeling of the DR programs. Many
models of DR programs have already been proposed by others, but they all have assumed
a constant price elasticity [20]. This might be helpful in simplifying the problem and giving
general results but is not acceptable for accurate studies. Another problem with constant
elasticity models is that when the price approaches zero, it reaches a steady value while it
should grow unlimitedly in a free market. Some other studies have modified the constantelasticity assumption by considering an elasticity that is constant but also changes
depending on the spot price being considered [21]. This approach needs elasticity values
to be recalculated for every change in the price but still has the deficiency of considering a
linear demand function in the first place. In the current research work a new model for DR
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programs is introduced that allows for more accurate studies of DR impacts on asset
management, and is more consistent with real behavior of electricity price versus demand.
Organization of this Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter two studies techniques that are
widely used to reduce fault currents. Effectiveness of protection systems in reducing
exposure times to fault currents are studied in Chapter three where security and
dependability analysis are performed to examine and compare their performance.
Effectiveness of FCL’s in reducing the magnitude of fault currents are studied and
compared in Chapter four. Case studies of using FCL’s are also illustrated in this chapter
that show several real world applications of these devices. Chapter five presents and
develops a new analytical model to analyze the direct impact of fault current magnitudes
and exposure times in reliability calculations. Chapter six uses this model along with results
of the previous chapters to study the impact of FCL’s and protection systems on
reliability/asset management. Chapter seven will study reliability improvements caused by
using DR programs to reduce the overload burdens on power systems. Finally, conclusion
and recommendations for future work are given in Chapter eight.
Figure 1 shows the flow chart of the work presented in this dissertation.
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Figure 1. Flow Chart of the work of this dissertation.

CHAPTER II
FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS
Introduction
In later chapters of this work, we will model fault current limiting devices and study their
impact on asset management. Therefore it is best to first have a basic understanding of
these devices and their role in power system operation.
Growth in the generation of electrical energy, particularly in the form of connecting
independent power producers (IPP’s) to the grid, and an increased interconnection of the
power grids would lead to higher fault currents which have not been included in the
conventional long term planning forecasts [22]. One of the consequences of this system
growth and the resulting high fault currents is that the network and the associated
equipment reach or even exceed their limits with respect to the short circuit current
withstand capabilities. At the same time, consumers request higher levels of reliability
which can be achieved by providing parallel transmission facilities. This will, however,
raise the fault current levels which in turn impose a severe burden on circuit breakers and
power system apparatuses. The challenge of the future network designs will then be to face
these challenges by utilizing new and effective technologies in the network.
The fault current over-duty problem can be alleviated by either replacing the existing
equipment with ones with higher fault current ratings and tolerances, or limiting the fault
current to values that could be safely interrupted by the existing equipment.
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Replacement of equipment could be avoided for the sake of cost savings. Reducing fault
levels is a more practical alternative and could have a positive impact on the life of
electrical components. Electric power system planners and operators, therefore, need new
techniques to limit short circuit currents at different voltage levels of the existing networks.
Fault Reduction Techniques
Conventional solutions for limiting fault current magnitudes to interruptible levels by the
existing circuit breakers include [23]:
- Construction of new substations: Fault current over-duties coupled with other factors may
result in a utility selecting this solution, which will correct the immediate problems, as well
as providing for future growth. However, this is the most expensive and most time
consuming of all the other solutions.
- Bus splitting and reconfiguring: This entails separation and isolation of fault sources that
could possibly feed a fault by opening normally closed bus ties, or by splitting the existing
busses. This effectively reduces the number of sources that can feed a fault, but also reduces
the number of sources that supply load currents during normal or contingency operating
conditions. This approach in turn can reduce the reliability and security of the power system
[14]. Splitting the buses is not desirable due to the decreased flexibility and the cost
associated with high voltage connections [24] and [25].
- Multiple circuit breaker upgrades: When a fault duty problem occurs, usually more than
one circuit breaker will be affected. Replacing or upgrading circuit breakers with ones with
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higher ratings, has the disadvantage of not reducing available high fault currents and their
associated hazards. This approach is also associated with the often prohibitive expense of
replacing the switchgears within a substation.
- Current limiting reactors and high impedance transformers: Fault current limiting reactors
limit fault currents by the impedance across their terminals, which increases during faults.
However, current limiting reactors also have a voltage drop under normal loading
conditions and present a constant source of losses. They can also interact with other system
components and cause potential instabilities.
- Sequential breaker tripping: A sequential tripping scheme prevents circuit breakers from
interrupting excessive fault currents at once. If a fault is detected, a breaker upstream to the
location of the fault current is tripped first. This reduces the fault current seen by the
breaker within the zone of protection at the location of the fault and this breaker can then
open safely. A disadvantage of the sequential tripping scheme is that it adds a delay of one
breaker operation before the fault is finally cleared. Also, opening the breaker upstream to
the fault location affects protection zones that were not originally impacted by that fault
[24]. Moreover, sequential tripping requires complex strategies that are technically very
difficult in some cases.
The above fault current reduction strategies, in spite of their benefits in lowering the stress
on interrupting devices, have the main disadvantage of unnecessarily tripping other
additional breakers and disconnects. This brings successive power outages that lower the
12

reliability of the network. It would also cause potential instabilities in the power system,
which in some cases may contribute to major cascading failures.
-Fault Current Limiters (FCL’s): There is a considerable interest in devices which are
capable of limiting fault currents designated as Fault Current Limiters (FCL) [26], [27],
[28], [29], and [30]. The FCL’s reduce fault currents to low and safe levels so that the
existing switchgears can still protect the grid [31]. The use of FCL’s allows equipment to
remain in service even if the fault current exceeds the peak and short-time withstand
capabilities of the equipment. These capabilities would be the rated short-circuit and the
breaking currents in the case of circuit breakers [25]. It follows that FCL’s would prevent
unnecessary outages and therefore improve system reliability.
There are many types of FCL’s [25]. These devices are basically required to provide: (1)
rapid respond to fault currents, (2) low impedance in normal operation, and (3) large
impedance during fault conditions [32]. The unique property of superconductor materials
to enter a highly resistive state once the transport current exceeds a critical limit, makes
them an ideal choice for making FCL’s [33]. Superconductive Fault Current Limiters
(SFCL’s) are therefore receiving considerable attentions as one of the key elements of the
future smart grids [24], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40] and [41].
Comparison and Economic Considerations
Table 1 summarizes the conventional solutions -for limiting fault currents to levels
tolerable by existing breakers-, and their respective pros, cons, and relative cost. The
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expected cost of a Superconductive Fault Current Limiter (SFCL), as a representative of
the category of FCL devices, is also shown. Table 1 primarily considers the initial capital
installation cost in the comparison. In the cases of multiple circuit breaker upgrades, the
cost of bus work reinforcement must also be considered, since the level of fault current is
not being reduced. As shown in Table 1, the SFCL is expected to be also cost-competitive
with all of the other solutions with the exception of current limiting reactors and sequential
breaker tripping. In these cases, a consideration of life-cycle costs and negative impacts on
system reliability may cause a utility consider the SFCL over other solutions.
Table 1. SFCL vs Conventional Solutions
Solution

Advantage

Disadvantage

Relative Expense

Relative Expense
to SFCL

New Substation

Provides for future
growth

Expensive and
lengthy to install

The most expensive
solution

More expensive
than SFCL

Bus Splitting

Separate the sources
of fault current

Separate the sources
of load current from
load centers and
undermines
reliability

High, if split bus not
already installed

More
expensive
than SFCL

Multiple
Circuit
Breaker Upgrades

Most direct solution
with no adverse side
effects

Difficult to schedule
outages; bus work
reinforcement also
required

High to medium,
depending
on
number of replaced
breakers

Most
multiple
breaker upgrades
are more expensive
than SFCL

Current
Reactors

Easy to install

Voltage drop and
power
losses;
Potentially causes
instability

Medium to low

SFCL cost higher

No major hardware
installation involved

Expands impact of
fault to wider range
of the system

Low

SFCL cost higher

Sequential
tripping

Limiting

breaker
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Classification of Fault Current limiters (FCL’s)
Pyrotechnic fault current limiters (Is-limiter)
The Is-Limiter consists of an extremely fast switch, which is capable of carrying a high
rated current but incapable of limiting the fault current, and a high rupturing capacity fuse
arranged in parallel as shown in Figure 2 [42]. The switch is connected in series with the
main conductor and an external trigger is required to open it when a fault occurs in the
system. When the main conductor is opened, the current start flowing through the parallel
fuse, where it is limited within 0.5 ms and then finally interrupted at the next voltage zero
crossing [43].

Figure 2. Is-Limiter: 1- Insulating Tube, 2- Charge, 3- Main Conductor, 4- Fuse, 5- Pulse
Transformer [42].
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The current flowing through the Is-Limiter is monitored by an electronic measuring and
tripping device. At the very first rise of a fault current, this device decides whether tripping
of the Is-Limiter is necessary. In order to reach this decision, the instantaneous current
value and the rate of current rise through the Is-Limiter are constantly measured and
evaluated.
When the set points are simultaneously reached or exceeded, the Is-Limiter trips in the
faulty phases. After operation, the limiter has to be disconnected by a series connected
circuit-breaker in order to get access for changing the tripped Is-Limiter. The invention of
the Is- Limiter was in 1955 and large number of them have been successfully used in DC,
AC and particularly in three phase systems since then. Is-Limiter is claimed to be capable
of interrupting fault currents up to 5 kA, within 1 millisecond after occurrence of the fault.
However, it is still limited to 40 kV rated voltage levels [44].
Current limiting reactor
Current Limiting reactors (CLR) are coils used to limit current during fault conditions.
These devices are widely used for fault current limiting in medium and low voltage
distribution systems, and is the most common and simplest type of fault current limiters.
Such reactors have a large value of inductive reactance and low ohmic resistances.
CLR is generally of two types: air cored type and iron cored type. For a current limiting
reactor, it is important that the magnetic saturation at high currents does not reduce the coil
reactance necessary to limit the fault current. Because of this, iron cores are not generally
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used in CLRs ( [45] and [46]). Air cored reactor does not suffer from magnetic saturation
and therefore their reactance is independent of the current. For this reason, air cored
reactors are the one that show more desirable characteristics and are therefore most
commonly used.
One of the main problems associated with this device, however, is the safety problem due
to the magnetic flux distributed through the space around CLR. Therefore, CLRs require
proper fencing due to the personnel safety considerations. Constant voltage drops that
would degrade the voltage profile of the system, possible resonance with other circuit
elements of the circuit causing potential stability problems, constant energy waste, and
distributed magnetic flux are among other important issues in regards to using CLR. [45]
has addressed the issue of selecting and placing CLR in various substation arrangements
to get optimized results in terms of limiting the fault effects and minimizing avoidable side
effects.
Solid State Fault Current Limiters
Solid-state fault current limiters consist of semiconductor devices which are able to
interrupt a fault current during its rise times before the peak value is reached. It is an
advanced current interruption technology which offers a viable solution against fault
current occurrences in the transmission and distribution systems. Recent developments in
power switching technology have made solid state limiters suitable for voltage and power
levels necessary for distribution system applications. In particular the progress in
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development of Silicon Carbide (SiC) semiconductors as well as advances in Silicon (Si)
based devices has drawn increased attention within the FCL R&D community, to the
utilization of these techniques/materials in making FCL devices. Solid state limiters use a
combination of inductors, capacitors and thyristors or gate turn off thyristors (GTOs) to
achieve fault limiting functionality.
[47] has done a comprehensive literature review on many different types of solid state
FCL’s. It suggests classifying the solid-state FCL topologies into three major groups: the
series switch, the bridge, and the resonant types. Although work on solid state FCL
indicates continuing progress in this field; however, a practical, efficient, reliable and
economically feasible solid state device, suited to utility needs, till now, has remained
elusive [47].
Electromagnetic Dynamic Fault Current Limiter (DFCL)
DFCL is an electromagnetic FCL which automatically & instantaneously adjusts its
impedance depending on the magnitude of the fault current, thereby maintaining the let
through current within a narrow range of values. A DFCL operates within half a cycle (8
milliseconds for 60Hz) to effectively protect downstream equipment and devices.
DFCL operates at ambient temperature and provides a variable impedance proportional to
the short circuit current, such that the more current tries to increase the more limiting action
will be provided by the device. DFCL has a very low power consumption and a low enough
impedance for up to normal currents, so that it does not cause a poor voltage regulation at
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normal operating conditions. DFCL’s are self-triggered devices and automatically return
back to their low impedance state after reduction of current to normal values. DFCL’s are
reliable and effective current limiting solutions for the smart grid. They are called
“dynamic” FCL’s because their impedance values vary with the current.
An DFCL essentially works on the principle of variation of inductive reactance of a coil
wound on a core which has a magnetic permeability proportional to the magneto motive
force (MMF) impressed upon the magnetic circuit. Such a variable permeability leads to a
reactance proportional to the current passing through the coil. The permeability of the
conventional magnetic materials for various flux densities is nearly constant in the
operating range below magnetic saturation, thus leading to nearly constant inductance and
inductive reactance values over a range of currents. The core material used in the DFCL’s
has radially pre-aligned magnetic domains in the inward and outward directions as
compared to conventional cores with random domain alignment [48]. DFCL’s have a
power rating of 9.35 MVA and are operating at customer plants since 2008 [49].
Superconducting Fault Current Limiters (SFCL)
The unique property of a superconductor to passively enter a highly resistive state once the
transport current exceeds a critical limit makes it an ideal choice for fault current limiters
[33]. This is due to the properties that it inherits from its superconductive nature; i.e., rapid
operation, having no resistance in the superconductivity mode but a large resistance in the
normal mode. By using superconductor materials, Superconducting Fault Current Limiters
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(SFCL’s) need no auxiliary circuits to detect and limit fault currents and hence they have
a high reliability. While other types of FCL’s, such as current limiting reactors (CLR’s),
cause a large voltage drop and power losses during non-fault conditions, SFCL’s produce
a negligible loss during normal operation, due to their very small resistance in the
superconductivity region. It is therefore expected that introduction of SFCL’s in electric
power systems can result in considerable improvements with respect to power quality,
voltage quality, and network flexibility [50]. Reviewing the literature in the area of fault
current limiters reveals that an absolute majority of published works on FCL’s are related
to superconductive FCL’s [26]- [30]. Studies show that SFCL provides a cost-effective
solution that besides a good performance in limiting the fault current at the very first cycle,
it also offers the benefit of enhancing the system reliability [22]. A SFCL performs this
function by reducing the stress on power equipment and preventing unnecessary outages.
Superconductors are materials that while in the super-conducting mode, have two main
properties:
-They pass current without ohmic losses; i.e. zero resistance,
-They don’t allow the magnetic field pass inside them; i.e. magnetic shield.
Superconductors lose the above properties when their critical current (or critical magnetic
field) is surpassed and they quench into the normal state.
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Based on the above two properties, in general there are two major types of SFCL’s –each
type using one of the above phenomenon, designated as resistive and shielded core [37].
Other main types of SFCLs include saturated iron-core type SFCL and Matrix Fault
Current Limiter. These SFCL types are introduced below.
Resistive Type SFCL’s
A resistive superconductor fault current limiter is directly connected in series with the
current path to be protected. This fault current limiter relies on the rapid change of
resistance with temperature. The principal schematic diagram of this type of FCL is shown
in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Resistive superconductive fault current limiters [22].
The resistive SFCL is designed such that under normal operating conditions the peak of
the ac current flowing through the superconducting element is less than the critical current
of the superconductor. In this situation SFCL is operating in the superconducting mode.
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No major 𝑅𝐼 2 losses or voltage drops are developed across the device in this mode. In
other words the SFCL is basically “invisible” to the grid.
Under fault conditions, the current in the grid exceeds the critical current level of the
superconductor. This surge current forces the superconductor to transit from its normal
superconducting state to a resistive state; thereby introducing the necessary current limiting
impedance into the grid. In order to protect the superconductor element from thermal
damages and to decrease its recovery time, a resistive or inductive shunt 𝑍𝑠ℎ might be
added to dissipate some part of the fault energy.
A cryostat holds the Superconductor resistor, 𝑅𝑆𝑐 , which is connected straight to the power
line by current leads. This is particularly designed for a minimal heat transfer. The load
switch 𝐿𝑆 in series is necessary to save the resistor 𝑅𝑆𝑐 from undue high power losses
during fault conditions after tripping and allows for a sufficiently short recovery time (11.5 s).
Superconductive shielded core reactor (SSCR)
Another candidate for SFCL is the so-called superconductive shielded core reactor (SSCR)
shown in Figure 4 [51]. This device uses a cylinder of bulk BSCCO-2212 or BSCCO-2223
superconductor to separate a normal copper coil from an iron core. In the normal operating
mode, the field from the copper coil does not penetrate the iron core due to the shielding
behavior of superconductor. In this case the impedance of the SFCL is limited to the small
value of leakage inductance. Under fault conditions, however, the current induced in the
22

superconductor is sufficient to drive it to its non-superconductive state, and the magnetic
field links the iron core. This greatly increases the impedance of the limiter, and hence
would limit the current. In addition, installing a "control ring" in the system to absorb some
of the energy deposited during a fault can reduce the recovery time of the shield following
a faulted state. The main disadvantages of this type of SFCL are its size and weight.

Figure 4. Inductive superconductive fault current limiter [51].

Saturated iron-core type SFCL
In the saturated-core SFCL’s, two iron cores (one for each half of the cycle) are saturated
by the dc magnetic field produced by a superconducting coil wrapped around each core.
The main power line is wound around both cores and, when the current becomes high
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enough (i.e. a fault) the cores are driven out of saturation and the impedance rises - limiting
the current.

Figure 5. Saturated iron-core type SFCL [46].
Figure 5 above shows a structure diagram of single-phase magnetic saturated core type
SFCL, which is composed of iron cores, AC windings, superconducting DC winding, DC
power and the control circuit [46]. Under the normal operating conditions, DC
superconducting coil generate a lot of magnetic flux which can make the iron core
saturated. Therefore it offers very small impedance to the power system and thus has no
adverse effects on normal transmission.
When a short circuit fault occurs, the current 𝑖𝐿 surges, and the fault monitoring system
will instantly cut off the DC exciting-current within a few milliseconds by means of a
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power electronic switch, such as insulated gate bipolar transistor (IGBT) or integrated gate
commutated thyristor (IGCT), in the DC control circuit. This will bring both of the two
cores out of their deep saturation status. In this case, the large fault current in the two AC
windings will produce a large inductive EMF which can limit the fault current. The
advantage of this concept is that it does not require the superconductor to become normal
to operate. However, it requires approximately twice as much iron (two cores). This system
does not use the special properties a superconductive material has and theoretically it could
be built without using superconductive conductors. In 2009, a saturated iron-core SFCL
device was experimentally tested in small-scale distribution networks in California, United
States [52]. In January 2010, the test field in California suffered a lightning-induced fault
and the FCL device limited the fault current as designed. A field test in a 138 kV
transmission network was also planned for the end of 2011 [52].
Matrix Fault Current Limiter
A particular type of SFCL, called Matrix Fault Current Limiter (MFCL), has been recently
under development by “SuperPower” Inc. and Nexans Superconductors GmbH [23]. A
MFCL uses the same current limiting strategy as a resistive type SFCL and its schematic
diagram is shown in Figure 6 [53] and [54].
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(a)

(b)
Figure 6. Matrix superconductive fault current limiter: (a) simplified model in an
electric circuit (b) the matrix assembly [53].
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Figure 6a shows a simplified equivalent representation of the MFCL in a power system. In
this figure, the MFCL is shown as a variable resistor in parallel with a reactor. Under
normal operating conditions, the peak of the AC current level of the power transmission
network is always below the critical current level of the superconductor. Therefore, there
is essentially no voltage drop and no ohmic losses caused by the device and the device is
“invisible” to the grid. When a fault occurs, however, fault current level exceeds the critical
current level of the superconductor, creating a quenching condition. The superconductor is
forced to make a transition to high resistive state and most of the fault current is shunted
into the parallel inductor to introduce a current limiting impedance of 𝑍0 into the grid to
limit the fault current.
Figure 6.b shows a schematic diagram of the current-limiting matrix that includes “ m ”
number of current-limiting modules electrically connected in series inside a MFCL. Each
module further includes 𝑛 number of current-limiting matrix elements electrically
connected in parallel. The current-limiting matrix is, therefore, an 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix. Each
current-limiting matrix element includes a parallel electrical arrangement of a
superconductor 𝑅 and an inductor 𝐿 .
The parallel-connected inductors in the current limiting matrices act as shunts. The partial
divergence of the surge current to the inductors, serves to reduce the 𝑅𝐼 2 heating of the
superconductors during the current limiting phase of the MFCL operation. This allows for
a fast recovery of the MFCL device to its superconducting state. Also, if a superconductor
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element fails for any reason, the parallel connected inductor can continue to carry the load
current, although a very small voltage drop will appear across the device [51].
Table 2 gives a comparison between current-limiting related features of various types of
FCL’s [46].

Table 2. Comparison of Various Types of Fault Current limiters [46]
Type

Max Rating

Air
Core
Reacto
r

Is-Limiter

36 kV

40.5 kV

2500 A

2500 A

Resisti
ve
SFCL

Superconductive
Shielded
Core
Reactor

Saturated
Iron Core
SFCL

Solid State
SFCL

DFCL

Hybrid

138
kV

11 kV

13.8 kV

69 kV

220 kV

12 kV

2000 A

1200 A

3000 A

200 A

2000 A

FCL

900 A

Activation
Time

-

<0.5 msec

<1/4
Cycle

Immediat
ely

Immediately

µsec order

<10 msec

100 msec

Reset Time

-

Non
Automatic
Recovery

Tens
of
msec
to 2
sec

<5 msec

Immediately

Controllable

20 msec

Controllable

Current
Reduction

Depen
d on
Reacto
r used

<70%

<80%

Low
20%

30% ~ 40%

Controllable

85%

Controllable

Need
Cooling

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes (Si)

No

Yes

Compact

Small but
additional
components

No (SiC)
Size/Weight

Bulky

Bulky

Small

Large
and
heavy

Large and
Heavy
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Small

may increase
size
Status

Comm
ercially
availab
le

Commercial
ly available

Design
ed and
Tested

R&D
Stage

R&D Stage

Development
Phase

Designed and
Tested

Research
Stage

It is shown in [55] and [56] that it is sufficient to limit fault currents with an activation time
less than of a quarter cycle. So all of these FCL devices satisfy current limiting requirement
in speed [57]. High limiting ratio of resistive SFCL’s will make them attractive choices in
areas with high fault duty problems. Immediate response of inductive type SFCL’s, on the
other hand, will minimize the exposure time to fault currents and hence will enhance many
operational aspects of the power system including the transient stability and security.
Table 3 shows the recommended locations for some major type FCl’s mentioned in Table
2 [57]. Based on Tables 2 and 3, it is concluded that SFCL’s are the only suitable devices
for application in the transmission/distribution level substations.
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Table 3. Recommended locations of FCL devices in smart grids [57]
FCL Location in

Resistive SFCL

Smart Grid

Saturated Iron

Solid State Fault

Core SFCSL

Current

DFCL

Limiters
Micro-grid

No

No

Yes

No

Renewable

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Energy
Resources
Distribution
Substation
Transmission
Substation

Comparing current limiting ratio of SFCL’s
In later chapters of this dissertation, impact of fault current limiting devices on asset
management are studied. Of specific importance is the performance of these devices in
limiting fault currents, which is found to be the key element in determining how efficient
they are in improving asset management and maintenance programs.
There are a number of literatures available that have performed quantitative and
comparative analyses on current limiting behavior of the SFCL’s. [58] has studied the
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impact of design parameters, and in particular the turn’s ratio, of the inductive type SFCL
in limiting the fault currents and also reducing the power burden of the superconductive
element. [58] has also shown that the performance of SFCL’s can vary depending on the
fault type on the power system. We will use some of the results presented in [58] in our
quantitative analysis of the impacts of SFCL’s. [59] has considered and compared various
application locations of SFCL’s and has shown that the performance of these devices in
limiting fault currents can vary based on their installation locations in the power system.
In [41], the effect of various fault types on limiting capability of SFCL’s is studied and
concludes that these devices can limit different fault types with different limiting ratios. It
is shown that e.g. in case of a single line-to-ground fault, the fault current is effectively
limited because the superconducting elements of the healthy phases and the reactors shared
the burden of the fault. In case of a double line-to-ground fault, the burden of the
superconducting elements was reduced because the power burden of the fault phases was
shared by the remaining healthy phase, but the fault current limiting rate was lower than
that of a single line-to-ground fault. The fault current limiting rate of the triple line-toground fault was similar to that of the double line-to-ground fault.
Studies in [60] and [61] show that better results in improving transient stability and
security of the power system would be obtained by using resistive SFCL’s compared to
inductive SFCL’s. [34] and [62] show that the resistive-SFCL displays greater resistance
than inductive-SFCL. This greater resistance makes the resistive-SFCL more effective than
inductive-SFCL for fault current limitation. Also the temperature of the superconductive
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material of the resistive-SFCL is greater than that of the inductive-SFCL. This makes the
operation of inductive-SFCL safer in comparison with the resistive-SFCL, and allow it to
afford successive faults [34]. Finally, the optimal combination between SFCL design, type
and location in power system would guarantee the best usage of this device in electric
networks of the future.
Application of SFCL in Power Systems
Application of SFCL’s is a viable approach to reduce the fault current. Under normal
operating conditions, a SFCL retains low impedance values so that the power flow is
unobstructed. In the event of a fault, however, the impedance of the SFCL rapidly
increases. Figure 7 illustrates three major configurations appropriate for SFCL installation
[63]. SFCL at the main position, A, can help reduce fault currents, prevent transformer
damage, and alleviate voltage dips on the upstream high-voltage bus during faults on the
medium-voltage bus. Thus, a larger, low impedance transformer can be used to maintain
voltage regulation at higher power level and meet increased demand on a bus without
circuit breaker upgrades. SFCL installed at bus tie position, B, in the event of a fault can
help maintain the voltage level on the un-faulted bus. Smaller and less expensive SFCL’s
can be installed in the feeder position, C, to provide protection of old and/or overstressed
equipment that are difficult to replace such as underground cables or transformers in vaults.
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Figure 7. Main positions for SFCL in the power grid.
Diverse studies have been carried out on SFCL application in power systems to solve
different issues due to fault current and other issues in the system. [64] and [24] introduce
the various applications of the SFCL’s in the transmission and distribution networks.
Using SFCL in Power Substations
As noted above, potential locations of SFCL’s in the power system include interconnection
of MV bus-bar, grid integration of distributed generation and power substations [64], [35]
and [65]. The fast response of SFCL’s and their higher voltage and current ratings would
make them ideal choices for application in transmission and distribution level substations
[57] , [46] and [36]. In next chapters of this document, application of SFCL’s in
transmission substations, including application of an SFCL in the electric transmission
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network in the USA will be studied in more details and will show that using SFCL would
improve the reliability and security measures of the load points and of the larger power
system.. [66] proposes a smart sub-transmission level fault current mitigation solution
using SFCL’s and substation automation system for managing fault current issues in
regions with high fault current levels. Application of SFCL’s in substations has been
studied in [36] and it is shown that SFCL’s can effectively reduce the fault duty levels to
those controllable by existing switchgears and protective devices. [22] studies application
of SFCL’s in a substation in North America and evaluates and compares the reliability
indices with and without the SFCL, and concludes that SFCL plays an important role in
improving the reliability and security indices of the substation and the entire power system.
A large number of possible substation configurations exist. The most commonly used ones
are: single sectionalized bus arrangement, main and transfer bus system, breaker and a half
and double bus systems [67]. These configurations are shown in Figure 8.
Single sectionalized bus arrangement.
All connections terminate on a common bus. This configuration is low in cost. However,
all components connected to a single bus should be de-energized for the bus maintenance
or if a fault occurs on a bus.
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(a) Single sectionalized bus arrangement

(b) Breaker and a half
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(c) Main and transfer bus system

(d) Double bus system
Figure 8. Common configurations in switching substation.
Breaker and a half.
This configuration is made of legs consisting of three series breakers connected between
two buses. Since two circuits are connected on each leg, 1.5 breakers are required for every
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circuit. This configuration has a high degree of flexibility and reliability. Repair or
maintenance could be performed on each breaker without disconnecting any circuit.
Main and transfer bus system.
A transfer bus is connected to a main bus through a tie breaker. All circuits are normally
connected to the main bus, but they can be transferred to the other bus using sectionalizing
switches. In this configuration, each breaker could be repaired without any circuit being
interrupted. In this case the coupling switch between buses would temporarily replace the
switch being repaired.
Double bus system.
In this system, a single breaker is used per circuit and that could be connected to either bus
via disconnect switches. A tie breaker between buses allows circuits to be transferred
without disconnecting them.
SFCL can be installed at three main locations in switching substations as shown in Figure
9. These locations include: feeder breaker position, main breaker position and bus-tie
breaker position. In the feeder breaker position, SFCL protects the feeder and all
downstream equipment. In this case, feeder equipment are either highly valuable or
difficult and costly to replace. Underground cables are good examples of this type of
equipment. Allocation of SFCL in the feeder breaker position has an advantage of requiring
a smaller current rating and a disadvantage of requiring one device for each feeder [68].
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Figure 9.Three main locations for SFCL in a substation: (a) feeder breaker SFCL (b)
main breaker SFCL (c) bus-tie breaker SFCL.
A SFCL in the main breaker position protects the main feeder and all bus-connected
feeders. In this case, however, a separate SFCL is required for each individual incoming
feeder.
A bus-tie SFCL allows two buses to be tied together without significantly raising fault
current on either bus [38].
In the feeder breaker position, SFCL only limits the fault current passing through that
feeder and therefore the worth of SFCL would only be equivalent to the cost of upgrading
one feeder breaker. The worth of installing SFCL in the main breaker position is higher as
the SFCL limits all fault currents coming from the main breaker and falling into outgoing
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feeders. So the SFCL value in this location is limited to the avoided cost of upgrading the
breakers connected to one bus. The bus-tie SFCL would eliminate the need to upgrade all
the substation breakers. Given the limiting requirements of utilities and the avoided
substation upgrading costs, installing SFCL in the bus-tie location represents an effective
and cost saving application of SFCL [38] .
As it can be seen from Figure 9, SFCL has to continuously carry the full load current in the
first two positions. Therefore, the bus-tie position SFCL appears to be the most economical
option among other alternatives because it would have the lowest losses under normal
operating conditions [68].
Coordination with Protection System
In order to provide sufficient current to the protective devices, SFCL should not limit the
current to a level that would be below the operating current of the relays. This, however,
does not apply when a SFCL is used at the bus-tie position [25]. In a bus-tie location,
SFCL could reduce the fault current to the steady state level or even lower. Therefore, in
the bus-tie location, the protective relaying is required to be able to detect the fault even
though the fault current is reduced to the normal value or less. Below is an example of this
situation.
Consider the circuit shown in Figure 10 (a) that shows a simple arrangement called “single
sectionalized bus arrangement”. If an active failure (short circuit) occurs at breaker 4, fault
currents will flow in the directions shown in Figure 10 (b). Current “I2” is the actual short
39

circuit current while “I1” has been limited by the SFCL. If the SFCL didn’t exist, in case
of a fault at breaker 4, the protective devices –which are usually differential relays- would
detect the fault and open breakers 1 and 2 simultaneously. With SFCL in the circuit,
although the current has been limited, it is still required to detect the fault and isolate it at
the earliest possible. Therefore, breaker 2 opens as a result of large short circuit current.
Breaker 1, however, doesn’t open and continues to send the normal current to load L1 until
the fault is detected and the “load interruptible disconnector” (LID) no. 4a interrupts the
fault current. Therefore, by installing the SFCL, load point L1 is not curtailed.
(a)

(b)

Figure 10. Single sectionalized bus arrangement: (a) before the fault (b) after the fault at
“4”.
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Application of SFCL in these arrangements and locations and their impacts on asset
management will be studied further later in this document, and results will be compared.
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CHAPTER III
DEPENDABILITY/SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Another important class of devices that limit the impact of fault currents on power
equipment and on the power system in general, are protection devices. Protection systems
are inseparable parts of power systems and are responsible for protecting valuable assets
and improving reliability and security of the power system. Protection systems perform
this by acting on time in limiting the spread of fault current to the healthy parts of the
system [69]. The degree of protection and assurance that these systems provide against
fault currents, is therefore dependent on how much “on-time” or how fast they can act in
detecting and clearing the faults in real time. This depends on factors such as design, relay
structure, and the protection scheme that is in place.
In this chapter we perform security and dependability analysis of protection systems. We
need the results of this analysis to be able to find the expected clearance time of various
protection systems. We will then use the expected clearance time along with the theory
developed in chapter five to determine impact of various protection systems on asset
management.
Reliability of protection systems includes two major areas of security and dependability
[70] and [71]. Security is the degree of certainty that protection systems will not operate
incorrectly when they should not operate, while dependability is the degree of certainty
that protection systems will operate correctly when they should operate [71].
In each moment of time, a protection system can reside in one of the following states:
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S

Protection succeeds in clearing internal faults (instantaneous)

F

Protection fails in clearing internal faults (protection not healthy while needed
to operate)

SB

Protection operated correctly to block over-tripping during external faults.
(Does not operate when it is not required)

MF

Malfunction (protection operated incorrectly)

SN

Protection is healthy but not required to operate

FN

Protection is not healthy while not required to operate

SD Protection succeeds in clearing fault but after a time delay (clearing is not
instantaneous)
During an internal fault (fault in the zone of protection that should be cleared by the
protection system), protection system can be in one of the states: 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷. If 𝑇𝑆 , 𝑇𝐹 ,
and 𝑇𝑆𝐷 are clearing times associated with these states respectively, then the expected
clearing time for the protection system would be:
𝛿 = 𝑃(𝑆). 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑃(𝐹). 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑃(𝑆𝐷). 𝑇𝑆𝐷

(1)
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Where 𝑃(𝑆), 𝑃(𝐹), and 𝑃(𝑆𝐷) are probabilities of being in states 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷, respectively.
To find the value of these probabilities, performing security and dependability analysis is
necessary.
To do this as a general practice, we focus our study on one of the most widely used types
of protection systems known as the pilot distance protection scheme [72].
Distance Protection Schemes and Application of Pilot Protection
The distance protection method is the most used techniques for preventing damages that
can be inflicted on transmission lines [72]. In recent decades, selectivity issues have raised
the demand for introducing a means of communication and therefore the so called “pilot
protection” into the regular distance protection schemes.
Selectivity in protection refers to the ability of protection system to isolate the faulty
component without affecting non-faulty parts of the power system [73]. Usually each major
component in power system is provided with its own protection system and their timing is
set in a way that selectivity is ensured. If the protection system responsible for the isolation
of the faulty component does not operate, a so called “back up” system will operate and
will usually isolate a bigger part of the system. Therefore, tripping time of the backup
system must be longer than that of the main system so that it can wait, and interferes only
after the main system failed to operate in the designated time.
In transmission networks, selectivity issue is much more complicated due to the large
number of equipment involved and their dispersed locations. In such systems, security calls
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for employing a relatively large number of protection devices and arranging them so that
sufficient time grading is allowed between tripping characteristics. As a result of this time
grading, considerable time delays would be allotted to the remote end devices. In many
applications such as EHV systems where lines carry large power transfers, delayed tripping
of faults may cause drastic network stability problems.
To avoid the unnecessary time delays when instantaneous fault clearance is intended, pilot
protection systems have been proposed. There are a number of pilot protection schemes
available [69]. The most important ones are discussed in the following parts of the paper.
These schemes differ widely in the degree of reliability they offer. A quantitative analysis
should therefore be performed to determine the security and dependability of each scheme
and to shed light on the subject of selecting the appropriate design with respect to the
required level of the reliability.
In this chapter, first pilot protection systems are introduced and various types of these
systems are discussed. Pilot protection systems generally include: DUTT1, PUTT2, POTT3,
DCB4 and DCUB5.

1

Direct Under-reach Transfer Trip
Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip
3
Permissive Over-reach Transfer Trip
4
Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme
5
Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme
2
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Distance protection is an accredited form of protection for transmission systems
particularly when the line terminals are relatively far apart. In a typical power transmission
line, such as the one shown in Figure 11, this is usually done by using the distance relays
“R” and “S” at the two ends of the line.

Time
Z3(S)

T3

Z2(S)

T2
T1
Distance

R

Z1(S)
Z1(R)

S

Distance
T1
T2

Z2(R)
T3

Z3(R)

Time

Figure 11. Typical transmission line protected by distance relays.

Assume that a fault occurs at the left end of the line close to relay “S”. Relay “S” recognizes
the fault as a zone 1 fault and trips the circuit breaker instantaneously. The relay at the
other end of the line detects the fault as a zone 2 fault. It is, however, not able to determine
if the fault near the left side bus is on one side or the other side of that bus. This will cause
a timer at relay “R” to be started, which will result in delayed tripping. In many
applications, this time delay is not acceptable. Adding a pilot channel from the left end to
the right end of the line could be considered as a means of eliminating the time delay. The
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pilot signal generated at relay “S” informs the right-end relay “R” that the fault is on the
protected line, thereby tripping should be initiated without delay.
There are several advantages in high-speed simultaneous tripping of all line terminals for
all internal faults [2]. Some of these advantages are as follows:
-

Reduced possibility of line damage

-

Improved power system transient stability

-

Allowance for high speed tripping, which if successful, improves transient stability,
minimizes the outage time, and improves voltage conditions.

Unit protection schemes compare the conditions at the two ends of the protected feeder
simultaneously. These schemes can positively identify whether the fault is internal or
external and are capable of providing high-speed protection for the whole feeder length.
However, unit protection schemes don’t provide backup protection to adjacent feeders as
given by distance protection schemes. The most desirable scheme is the one that combines
the features associated with both arrangements, i.e. instantaneous tripping for the whole
feeder length plus back up protection to adjacent feeders. This can be achieved by
interconnecting the distance protections at each end of the protected line by a signaling
channel as shown in Figure 12.
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Relay
Equipment

Communication
Equipment

Relay
Equipment

Communication Media (channel)

Communication
Equipment

Figure 12. General view of a pilot protection system [69].
Traditional communication channels used for pilot protection include pilot wires, power
line carrier (PLC), and microwaves. The latter two channels are still widely used by
utilities.
Fiber optics emerged in the early 1980s as a new type of communication means for pilot
protection [74]. Fiber optic channels have broad bandwidths and eliminate electrical
induction, noise, and electrical insulation problems of pilot wire channels.
The voltages and currents at each end of the transmission line are monitored by the local
relay equipment where trip signals maybe generated and sent to the local circuit breakers.
In addition, the local relay sends a signal (either a logic information or phase or current
information depending on the scheme of protection) to the relay equipment at the remote
end of the line through the communication equipment and channel. This provides each
relay location with important new information regarding the need for tripping [69].
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Classification of Pilot Protection Systems
Pilot protection systems can be classified according to the transmission media or the
channel usage [69].
By Transmission Media Used
The media used for the transmission of protection signals are: power line carrier (PLC),
microwave, fiber optics, and telephone leased lines.
The choice of utilizing the pilot signals depends on several factors, such as the availability
of fiber optic or microwave paths, cost, reliability, and type of the relay scheme.
In power system protection communications, the signaling applications have traditionally
been analog transmission in any of these media, although digital systems are predominating
as they are becoming available with reasonable costs.
By Channel Use:
In terms of channel use, pilot systems can be either transfer trip or blocking systems.
Transfer trip systems.
In the transfer trip systems, a channel signal must be transmitted and received before
tripping occurs at internal faults. No channel signal is required for external faults. Transfer
trip systems differ in the principle they use for sending the trip signals. The most important
transfer trip systems are as follows:
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Direct under-reach transfer trip scheme (DUTT) [75].
The DUTT scheme uses an instantaneous zone 1 element to trip the local circuit breaker
and initiate a transfer trip to the remote end. Once the transfer trip signal is received, the
remote end trips immediately without any additional verification. The basic logic circuit is
shown in Figures 13.b and c. This scheme is extremely simple but is susceptible to
undesired tripping if channel noise keys the direct trip signal. This is why it is rarely used.
This risk can be minimized by using a dual-channel transfer trip, which requires the receipt
of two signals from the remote ends to affect a trip.
R

S
Zone 1S
Zone 1R
(a)

TX

TX

RX

RX
Trip R

Trip S

Zone 1S

Zone 1R

(b)

Signal
Send
Z1
Z2

Z2t
0

Trip

Z3t
Z3
0
Signal
Received

(c)

Figure 13. Direct under-reach transfer trip protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) Pilot
protection logic.
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Permissive under-reach transfer trip scheme (PUTT) [75].
The DUTT scheme can be modified to be more secure by supervising the received signal
with the instantaneous zone 2 operations before permitting a trip, as shown in Figure 14.
This modified scheme; i.e. PUTT, uses zone 1 to trip the local breaker and sends a
permissive trip signal to the remote end. The remote end breaker trips when it receives the
permissive signal, if its zone 2 element detects a fault. As it uses the zone 2 element to
supervise tripping on receipt of the permissive signal, unlike DUTT, this scheme is less
susceptible to mal-operation under noisy channel conditions. Because the scheme uses an
under-reaching element to send permission, PUTT doesn’t send a permissive signal for
out-of-section faults.
R

S
Zone 1S
Zone 2S
Zone 1R
Zone 2R
(a)

Zone 2S

TX

TX

RX

RX
Trip R

Trip S

Zone 1S

Zone 2R
Zone 1R

(b)

Figure 14. Permissive under-reach transfer trip protection. (a) Zones of protection (b)
Protection Logic.
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Permissive Over-reach Transfer Trip Scheme (POTT) [75] :
POTT schemes use an over-reaching zone 2 element to send a permissive trip signal to the
remote end. The remote end breaker trips when it receives the permissive signal, if its zone
2 element is detecting a fault as well. Figure 15 illustrates the POTT scheme.
If distance relays with mho characteristics are used, the scheme is better suited than the
PUTT for protecting short lines. The reason for this is that the resistive coverage of the
zone 2 unit is greater than that of zone 1.

R

S

Zone 2S
Zone 2R
(a)

TX

TX

RX

RX
Trip R

Trip S
Zone 2S

Zone 2R
(b)

Figure 15. Permissive over-reach transfer trip protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) Pilot
protection logic [75].

52

Blocking systems.
In the blocking systems, the channel is only used to prevent tripping of the remote circuit
breakers on external faults. The channel signal is not required for internal faults; i.e.
tripping occurs in the absence of a channel signal.
Directional comparison blocking scheme (DCB) [75].
Unlike the above schemes, in which a signal is sent when a fault is detected in the forward
direction, DCB scheme sends a signal (block trip) when a fault is detected in the reverse
direction. If the local relay detects a reverse fault (using zone 3), it sends a block trip signal
to the remote end. At the remote end, the over-reaching zone 2 elements are allowed to
trip, following a short coordinating time delay (shown in Figure 16 as T), if they are not
blocked by the arrival of the block trip signal. In practice, zone 3 units are set with a forward
offset characteristic to provide back-up protection for bus-bar faults after zone 3 time delay.
This makes it necessary to stop the blocking signal being sent for internal faults. This is
achieved by making the signal sending circuit conditional upon non-operation of the
forward looking zone 2 unit, as shown in Figure 16.
The on-off power line carrier is the channel which is almost always used with DCB scheme.
Since the communication channel is not required for tripping, internal faults that might
short and interrupt the channel (in case of PLC) are not a problem. Over-tripping will
occurs, however, if the channel or local relay equipment fail to operate for external faults
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within the reach of the trip fault detectors. Since the carrier transmitter is normally off (nontransmitting state), channel failure can’t be detected until the system is tested or an external
fault occurs. This limitation has led to the development of a number of check-back
schemes.

Zone 3S
Zone 2S
R

S

Zone 2R
Zone 3R
(a)

Zone 3R

Zone 3S

T
Zone 2S

TX

TX

RX

RX
Trip R

Trip S
0

0

T Zone 2R

(b)

Figure 16. Directional comparison blocking protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) Pilot
protection logic [75].
Directional comparison unblocking scheme (DCUB) [75].
The solid-state logic diagram for this type of system is shown in Figure 17(b).
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Zone 2S
S

R

(1)

(2)

Zone 2R
PLC channel f1
PLC channel f2
(a)

Lockout
Block
Frequency

OR1

AND1

AND2

150

Zone 2S
AND3

0

Unblock (trip)
Frequency

Trip S

OR2
(b)

Figure 17. Directional comparison unblocking protection. (a) Zones of protection (b)
logic circuit.
Normally, a block frequency is transmitted and OR-1 has no output. Therefore, both AND1 and AND-2 are unsatisfied, which means that OR-2 has no output. The block frequency
is removed for an internal fault, which means that OR-2 will be satisfied whether the
unblock signal is operable or not. This is important as it is possible that the unblock signal
is shorted out by the fault. When this occurs, OR-1 gives an input to AND-2 which satisfies
this gate for 150ms. Then AND-2 picks up OR-2 to provide an input to AND-3. Without
this unblock signal, 150ms is provided for tripping. After 150ms, lockout is initiated since
one of the inputs to AND-2 is removed. This removes the input to AND-3.
If the unblock signal is received, this results in an input to OR-2 to directly provide input
to AND-3, which results in a trip. The unblock signal also removes an input to AND-1 to
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stop the timer. Table 4 describes the operation of the DCUB, associated with faults (1) and
(2) shown in Figure 17(a).
Table 4. Summary of Operation of the Directional Comparison Unblocking
Type of fault

(1) Internal

(2) External

Events at station S

Events at station R

Zone 2S operates. f1
channel shifts to unblock.
Loss of block and/ or
receipt of unblock (f2)
inputs to AND-3. Trip.

Zone 2R operates. f2
channel shifts to unblock.
Loss of block and/or receipt
of unblock (f1) inputs to
AND-3. Trip.

Zone 2S operates. f1
channel shifts from block
to unblock. F2 channel
continues to block. No
trip.

Zone 2R does not see fault.
Loss of block and/or receipt
of unblock (f1) inputs to
AND-3. No trip.

In this work in order to compare the impact of adding redundancy to specific parts of the
pilot protection system as well as using different media for communication, the following
configurations have been considered and studied for each pilot scheme


Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel



Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)



Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic)



Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic)



Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW)



Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)
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Event Tree Analysis
The event tree development process determines the boundaries of the particular analysis
by defining the initiating event and the possible outcomes for each sequence of events. The
event tree analysis defines possible scenarios including success, and partial and/or
complete system/subsystem failure. Because of this, event tree analysis is a preferred
method in studying complex systems and those whose response and consequences are not
quite obvious and need a more in-depth cause and effect analysis. Other similar techniques
such as fault trees are often used to quantify system events that are part of event tree
sequences [3].
An event tree is a pictorial representation of all events which can occur in a system. It is
defined as a tree because the pictorial representation gradually fans out like the branches
of a tree as an increasing number of events are considered. Beginning with an initiating
event; the event tree details a sequence of pivotal events that lead to specific end states
(e.g. OK, Partial Failure or Failure).
In a protection system, event tree is typically started with a particular event – e.g.
occurrence of a fault- and continues in each step by considering the operation or failure of
the elements in that stage. This procedure is continued until it reaches the system success,
failure, or any other modes of interest. In this way, a pictorial diagram of the system
behavior is built up.
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Here, the term “protection system success” is defined as “the ability of protection system
to clear the fault in a prescribed time”; any deviation from this definition is not regarded as
a system success. A list of abbreviations used in the event tree diagrams and a short
definition of each term are given in the beginning of this chapter.
It should be noted that in order to calculate reliability indices from the event tree diagrams,
failure rate and unavailability of various elements of the system should be known. In this
chapter, after drawing the event tree diagrams, failure mechanisms of the protection system
are studied.
Internal and External Faults
It is useful to note that, from the protection viewpoint, not all internal faults are the same
within the zone of the protected line. There are two major areas to be considered throughout
the line as shown in Figure 18. These areas include the two end zones of the line and the
overlapping zone. The overlapping zone area is within the zone 1 reach of both relays.
However, the end zones are detected as zone 1 by the nearby relay and as zone 2 by the
remote relay. Different reaction is expected from the protection scheme in clearing the fault
in these areas and consequently different event trees should be constructed for each case.
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End zone
F1

S

Overlapping
zone

End zone
R

F3

F5

F4

F2

Zone 1S
Zone 1R

Figure 18. Classification of faults: F1&F2-External faults, F3&F4-internal end-zone
faults, F5-internal overlapping-zone fault.
However, the above bordering rule is not completely rigid. The reason is that the accurate
impedance of the line may not be available in each zone reach. In practice, faults near the
borders of these areas could result in malfunction of the protection system. More accurate
analysis is required in order to take these errors into account.
Building Event Trees
The inherent advantage of the event tree is its capability to investigate the attitude of the
protection scheme when a fault occurs in the system. Since the philosophy of protection is
different in case of internal and external faults, it is necessary to distinguish these two faults
when building the event trees.
With respect to the above points, an event tree analysis has been performed for each pilot
scheme discussed earlier and results are shown in Figures 18 to 20 as referring to the list
provided in the following table.
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Table 5. List of Event Tree Illustrations for Pilot Protection Schemes

Configuration of pilot protection (see below)
Pilot

Type of

Scheme

fault

Config.
1

Config.

Config.

Config.

Config.

Config.

3

4

5

6

2

External
DUTT

Fig.19.a

Fig.19.c

Fig.19.e

Fig.19.g

Fig.20.a

Fig.20.c

Fig.19.b

Fig.19.d

Fig.19.f

Fig.19.h

Fig.20.b

Fig.20.d

Fig.21.a

Fig.21.c

Fig.21.e

Fig.21.g

Fig.21.i

Fig.21.k

Fig.21.b

Fig.21.d

Fig.21.f

Fig.21.h

Fig.21.j

Fig.21.l

Fig.22

Fig.24

Fig.26

Fig.28

Fig.30

Fig.32

Fig.23

Fig.25

Fig.27

Fig.29

Fig.31

Fig.33

fault

Internal
fault

External
fault
DCB
Internal
fault

External
fault
DCUB
Internal
fault

The referred configurations in above table are as follows:
config. 1: Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel
config. 2: Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW)
config. 3: Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)
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config. 4: Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic)
config. 5: Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic)
config. 6: Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)
Event Trees for Direct Under-reach Transfer Trip (DUTT)
The event tree for this scheme is shown in Figures 19 a to h and 20 a to d.
The diagrams consist of individual events representing the failure or success of each
component in the system. Failure rates and probabilities associated with these events will
be introduced in the next part of the chapter.
It can be seen from these figures that for external faults failure of any component within
the protection system would result in mode “FN” in case of an external fault. If all elements
are healthy, though, the protection is healthy but yet not required to operate (SN). Please
refer to beginning of this chapter for a complete list of protection system modes used in the
figures.
In Figure 19.e, DUTT single relay/ redundant channels (MW+ relay to relay phone line),
if any component of the MW channel- say tone equipment at “S” side- is faulty, the fault
tree reaches to the point “A” in the fault tree diagram, where checks the second media
channel (phone line here) for health and again results in “FN” if the auxiliary channel is
faulty as well.
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Figure 19.b1 illustrates the concept of redundancy in protective relays and can be described
as follows: If the primary protection at “S” fails due to the hardware failure or relay being
misapplied, the event tree reaches to point “B”. At this point, the backup protection is
examined for health. If the protection at “S” (primary or backup) is neither hardware-faulty
nor misapplied, the event tree continues to point “D” indicating that protection at “S” is
healthy. The same scenario is repeated for the protection at “R”.
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MW Eq. (R)
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Figure 19. Event tree for DUTT. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF:
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time
delay
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Figure 20.c illustrates the situation where redundant relays and independent channels
(MW+ relay to relay phone line) are applied. In this case, if the relay on channel 1 is faulty
at “S”, the event tree reaches point “A” where the second channel relay is examined for
being healthy. Should the channel 2 relay work, the event tree continues in the bottom
branch or else the system stops in “FN” mode. In the bottom path, only channel 2 relay is
healthy and hence the event tree continues regardless of status of channel 1 relay in station
“R”. If in channel 2 of station “R”, both relay and communication are healthy, the entire
system is healthy while not required to operate (SN); otherwise, it results in “FN”. Point
“B” is where the channel 1 relay is healthy and channel 2 relay fails and continues on the
middle branch with examining only channel 1 at station “R”.
The top path continues when both channel 1 and channel 2 relays at “S” station are healthy.
In this case, if channel 1 relay at “R” fails, only channel 2 remains healthy and the event
tree reaches point “C” to examine channel 2 media, i.e. microwave. Similarly, event tree
reaches “D” when channel 2 relay at “R” fails leaving only channel 1 healthy. Moreover,
if both channel relays at “R” are healthy, the system could work through either channel,
i.e., if one media fails it goes straight to the other one. This concept is represented by point
“E” in the event tree.
Figure 19.b states that any error in the protection system at “R” or “S” would result in “F”
mode. Defects in the communication, however, stop the permissive protection and the fault
is cleared with time delay of zone “2” that is denoted with “SD”. If the internal fault is in
the overlapping zone as defined in Figure 19, instantaneous zone 1 elements of both relays
directly clear the fault and the pilot media is bypassed (Figure 19.b second diagram).
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In the next configurations, redundancy is added in terms of extra relays and/or channels
and the same ideas are applied as above.
Note that in all cases, successful clearing of internal faults within the end zones requires
proper pilot signaling while this is not the case in the overlapping area.
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Figure 20. Event tree for DUTT. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF:
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time
delay

Inclusion of Noisy Channels
In above calculations the impact of noisy channels was not considered. More accurate
investigation could be performed by adding noise to the channel. Communication path is
usually long and may be vulnerable to erroneous excitation by storms, mutual induction,
or other means.
The impact of noise can be considered only on microwave channel due to its exposure to
outdoor conditions. Moreover, it is often sufficient to study the effects of noise on the
DUTT scheme since the other pilot schemes are made robust to the noisy channels by using
the supervisory system that checks the validity of the received signal.
The overall reliability index of a protection scheme can be calculated using the concept of
expectations as bellow:

Overal Reliability Index  P (noisy channel)" index  with  noise"
 (1  P (noisy channel))." index  without  noise"

(2)

Where P(noisy channel)is the probability that the communication channel is noisy.
Event Tree for Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip Scheme (PUTT)
As noted earlier the principle of protection is the same for DUTT and PUTT schemes in
terms of using communication channels for various areas of protection. The main
difference is that PUTT has been made secure to the channel noises using a supervising
function. Therefore, the event tree diagrams for PUTT are the same as those of DUTT
shown in Figures 19.a to 19.f. However, with an exception that in case of DUTT channel
noises should be taken into account using Equation (1). This difference between DUTT
and PUTT schemes are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Performance of DUTT and PUTT against Noisy Channels

Internal faults

External faults

Type of fault
Overlapping zone

End zones

within zone 2 reach

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Communication channel
required?

DUTT
Malfunction if channel
noisy?

Communication channel
required?

PUTT

Malfunction if channel
noisy?

Event Tree for Directional Comparison Blocking (DCB)
Figures 21.a to 21.l show the event trees for DCB scheme. Similar to the previous schemes,
diagrams start with the case of a single relay - single channel and continue with adding
appropriate redundancies in the scheme. Since the zone 1 element, in this scheme, does not
play any role in clearing in-section faults, there is no difference between faults occurring
in overlapping area and end zones. External faults are, however, treated based on their
location against zone 2; e.g. external faults within the zone 2 reach of either relays are
suspicious to mal-operation if the corresponding blocking signal is not received. This is
shown in Figure 21.a by reaching the “MF” (mal-function) mode if the communication
device or local relay fails in sending the block signal to the remote station. It is useful to
note that status of the C.B. in the local station doesn’t have any effect on sending the block
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signal, and therefore it is bypassed in the event tree. If the system is sound, however, overtrip is avoided and “SB” (success in blocking over-trip) is reached.
In case an internal fault happens (Figure 21.b), no block signal is transferred and both relays
are allowed to clear the fault immediately or after a prescribed delay. In this situation, every
failure of the protection system would lead to the “F” mode irrespective of the channel
status.
Figures 21.c and 21.d describe the condition of dual redundant relays and a single channel.
When an external fault occurs, the local relay should block tripping and if the primary relay
fails the backup would perform this task. If neither primary nor backup relay manages
and/or signaling fails, the relay will over-trip (MF).
Internal faults, however, are successfully cleared only when all protective devices at both
sides act normally regardless of the communication.
In Figure 21.e if the first channel fails, the second one is examined at point “y” and if both
channels fail the system would over-trip. If either channel manages to transmit the blocking
signal, “SB” would result. Figure 21.f is the same as Figure 21.b, because the channel status
is not important in internal faults.

71

External
faults within
Z2S reach

External
faults within
Z2R reach

Protection at R

A

(a)

FN

FN

FN
FN

A
A

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

MW Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

SB

MF

FN
FN

MF

MF

MF

Protection at S

MF

MF

All
internal
faults

FN

A
FN
FN

FN
MF

FN
FN
FN

FN

(b)

Protection at R

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

MW Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Communication

FN
MF

MF

SB

MF

MF

F
F

72

Protection at S
MF

MF

Communication

MF

MF

MF

MF

MF

MF

S

F
F

F
F

F
F

F
F

External
faults within
Z2S reach

External
faults within
Z2R reach
FN

I

E

Primary Backup

Protection at S

I
J

H

MF

E

G
FN

C

B
B
B

B
FN

A

(c)

Protection at R

D

G
C
D

FN

A
D

FN

FN
MF

MF

All
internal
faults

D

H

FN

FN

F

MF

FN

MF

F

FN

Protection at S

G

Primary Backup

MF
MF

F

F
F

FN
FN
FN

FN

(d)

SB

F

F

MF

Primary Backup

MF

G

MF

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

MW Channel

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

MW Channel

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Communication

73

Primary Backup

Communication

MF

Protection at R

J

S

FN

F
S

MF

F

MF

S

F
F
F

F
F

External
faults within
Z2S reach

External
faults within
Z2R reach

Protection at R

x

Y
SB

FN

FN
FN

Y
Y

Y

Y

FN

Y

FN
FN

x
x
FN

FN

FN
FN
FN

(e)
SB

MF

Relay H/W (S)

Y

Y

All
internal
faults

Relay Misapp.(S)

Y

SB

Protection at S

FN
MF

FN
MF

MF

MF

FN

x
MF

(f)

Y

Protection at R

MF

Modem (R)

Modem (S)

Phone channel

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

MW Channel

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Modem (R)

Modem (S)

Phone channel

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (S)

MW Channel

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Communication Communication
Channel 1
Channel 2

74

Protection at S

Communication Communication
Channel 1
Channel 2

MF

S

F
F
F

F
F

F
F
F

MF

F
F

FN
MF

MF

MF

External
faults within
Z2S reach

External
faults within
Z2R reach

Protection at R

FN
FN

FN

x

(g)

SB

MF
MF

MF

FN
MF

FN
FN

x
x
FN

FN

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

MF

SB

All
internal
faults

MF

x

Protection at S

FN

FN

F
F

F
F

F
F

FN
FN

(h)

FN
FN
FN

Protection at R

MF
MF

Com. Eq. (R)

Com. Eq. (S)

Fiber Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Com. Eq. (R)

Com. Eq. (S)

Fiber Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Communication

75

Protection at S

MF

MF

Communication

MF

S

F
F

F
F

External
faults within
Z2S reach

External
faults within
Z2R reach

Protection at R

FN

FN

x
x
FN

x
FN
FN

FN

(i)

SB

MF
MF

FN
FN

FN
FN

FN
FN

FN

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Multiplexed Fiber
Optic Transceiver (R)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

Multiplexed Fiber
Optic Transceiver (S)

Fiber Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

MF

MF

All
internal
faults

MF
MF

Protection at S

MF
MF
MF

FN
F

x
FN
MF

(j)

MF

SB

Protection at R

MF

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Multiplexed Fiber
Optic Transceiver (R)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

Multiplexed Fiber
Optic Transceiver (S)

Fiber Channel

CT/VT (R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

CT/VT (S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Communication

76

Protection at S

MF

MF

Communication

MF

S

F
F

F
F

F
F

F
F
F

Protection at R

MW Eq. (S)

MW Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (R)

MW Channel

Modem (S)

Modem (R)

Phone Channel

Com. DC P.S. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

CT/VT (R)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

CT/VT (S)

Protection at S

Channel
#2

Channel
#1

Channel Channel
#2
#1

Channel Channel
#1
#2

Communication
A
MF
MF
MF
MF
MF
MF
MF
MF

MF
MF
MF

SB

F

I
MF

MF

MF

I

MF

MF

MF

A

MF

MF
MF

MF
MF

A

MF
MF

G
FN

MF

MF

G
External
faults within
Z2S reach

MF

MF
MF

FN
MF

FN
MF

FN

F

FN

F
B1
B1
FN

SB

FN

MF

FN

MF

F

MF
MF

F

MF
MF

E

SB

MF

A1
MF

FN

FN

A1

MF

FN

E

MF

FN
MF

MF

FN

B1

Z

MF
MF

B1
MF

B1

FN

FN

FN

FN
FN

Z
External
faults within
Z2R reach

MF

Y
Y
Y

X

MF

FN

X
FN

Y

FN

FN
FN

(k)

77

Protection at S

Protection at R

MW Eq. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (S)

MW Channel

Modem (R)

Modem (S)

Phone Channel

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

C.B. (R)

CT/VT (R)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

C.B. (S)

CT/VT (S)

Com. DC P.S. (S)

Channel
#1

Channel Channel
#2
#1

Channel Channel
#1
#2

Channel
#2

Communication

G

S

E

F

E
F

78

S
F
F

F

G
F
F

F
All
internal
faults

F

F

F
F

(l)
Figure 21. Event Tree for DCB. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction,
SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay

Event Tree for Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB)
The event tree diagrams are shown in Figures 22 to 33. In drawing these diagrams. It is
assumed that failure of the relay will not affect sending the blocking signal; i.e. blocking
signal will continue when it should, regardless of the relay status.
Figure 22 illustrates the behavior of the scheme when an external fault occurs. If the fault
happens to be in the zone two of relay S, this relay would stop sending block signal to relay
“R”, but since relay “R” doesn’t see anything in its zone 2 reach it will never operate.
Therefore, health or failure of relay “R” will not affect the whole performance. Relay “R”,
however, continues to block relay “S”.
The scheme could malfunction if the communication fails after the fault inception. This is
because if the communication fails, block signal is not received at “S” causing AND-2 in
Figure 17.b to feed an input to OR-2 during a 150ms window. Since relay “S” sees the fault
in its zone 2, P(R) =1 and thus will operate AND-3 during the time period. If this 150ms is
sufficient for the protection at “S” to trip, mal-operation will occur. If not, a lockout signal
will be generated after 150ms indicating that the channel is faulty and the conventional
distance protection would stop mal-operation (SB).
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Figure 22. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), external fault. S:
Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF:
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not
required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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S

Internal faults are examined in Figure 23. If the fault occurs in the overlapping area, it is
cleared by the instantaneous zone 1 elements of both relays, regardless of the
communication media.
Fault in the end-zones, say R, is recognized by the instantaneous zone 1 element of relay
“R” at local station and by zone 2 element of relay “S” at the remote station. Relay “R”
clears the fault directly and stops the blocking signal to station “S”. At station “S”, loss of
block signal along with the zone 2 detection signal allows a permissive trip in a 150ms
window. If relay “S” manages to trip in the 150ms interval, fault is successfully cleared.
Otherwise, a trip (unblock) signal is required for tripping. In the latter case, if the
communication is healthy, the trip signal is received at “S” and fault is successfully cleared.
If communication fails, however, a loss of block and unblock signals at “S” is reported via
the lockout signal and fault is cleared with the zone 2 time delay of relay “S” (SD).
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Figure 23. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), internal fault.
S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF:
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not
required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
Figures 24 through 27 suggest the same idea as Figures 22 and 23 except for the relay or
channel redundancy. The communication media is changed in Figures 28 and 29 to fiber
optic but the basic principle remains the same.
Figure 32 illustrates the event tree diagram for redundant relays on independent channels
when an external fault occurs. Similar to Figure 24, relay “R” doesn’t play any role for the
fault in zone two reach of relay “S”. In this case, if both relays at station “S” work properly,
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health in any of the channels would successfully block the over-tripping, SB (top path of
tree). If both channels fail at this stage, loss of the blocking signal and zone 2 detection of
relay “S” would allow for a 150ms trip window as before. If one of the relays on station
“S” is faulty, the same scenario repeats with the communication media corresponding to
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Figure 24. Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ single channel (MW), external fault. S:
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required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 26. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay
phone line), external fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully
blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN:
Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 27. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay
phone line), internal fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully
blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN:
Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 28. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), external
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MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and
not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 29. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), internal
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping,
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and
not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 30. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), external
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping,
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and
not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 31. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), internal
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping,
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and
not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay
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Figure 32. Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ independent channels (MW+ relay to
relay phone line), external fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB:
successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not
required, FN: Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a
time delay
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Figure 33 shows the case of internal faults. The top branch of the tree diagram represents
the situation where the relays on both channels are sound. In this case, the health of either
channel could result in the protection system success.
If only one relay on either channel is healthy, tree reaches point “B” wherein signaling
cannot be performed although each substation has a healthy relay. In this case, faults within
the overlapping area could still be successfully cleared by zone 1 elements of healthy
relays. Faults on end-zones can also be cleared successfully if the tripping takes place in
the 150ms time interval. Otherwise, loss of both block and trip signals –due to healthyfaulty status of relays on either channel– results in a delayed tripping.
On the other hand, if both relays on either channel 1 or channel 2 are healthy, tree reaches
points “I” or “C”, depending on the healthy relays being on channel 1 or channel 2,
respectively. In this case, the tree diagram is continued as before with examining only the
corresponding communication media.

92

Protection at R

MW Eq. (R)

MW Eq. (S)

Tone Eq. (R)

Tone Eq. (S)

Modem (S)

Modem (R)

MW Channel

Channel
#2

Channel
#1

Channel Channel
#2
#1

Channel Channel
#1
#2
Protection at S

Phone Channel

Com. DC P.S. (S)

Com. DC P.S. (R)

Protection Fault
Clearing Time

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

Relay H/W (R)

Relay Misapp.(R)

C.B. (R)

Relay DC P.S.(R)

CT/VT (R)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

Relay H/W (S)

Relay Misapp.(S)

C.B. (S)

Relay DC P.S.(S)

CT/VT (S)

Fault
Location

Communication

H

I
I

SD

> 150 ms
SD

S

S

< 150 ms

J
J
J
SD

> 150 ms
SD

S

< 150 ms

Fault Within
Overlap Area

C

Fault Within
Endzone (S)

Fault Within
Endzone (R)

S

K
K
K

S

C
H
G

S

F

SD

F

F

SD

Fault Within
Endzone (R)

F
F

SD

> 150 ms

SD
SD
S

< 150 ms

E

B

E

S

F

F

G

Fault Within
Overlap Area

I

F

F

D

F

C

Fault Within
Endzone (S)

B
SD

> 150 ms

S

< 150 ms

Fault Within
Overlap Area

B

S

S
SD
SD

K

Fault Within
Endzone (R)

A

SD
SD

SD

> 150 ms
SD

S
S

< 150 ms

SD
SD

C
A
F

SD

> 150 ms
SD

< 150 ms

S

F

Fault Within
Overlap Area

F

D
F

SD
SD

F

G

All
internal
faults

F

Fault Within
Endzone (S)

J

F
F

F
F

S

Figure 33. Event tree for DUCB redundant relay/ independent channels (MW+ relay to
relay phone line), internal fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB:
successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not
required, FN: Protection not healthy and not required, SD: Protection succeeds after a
time delay
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Device Failure Rates and Unavailability
To perform calculations based on the above event trees, it is required to have the reliability
data associated with the protection system components. A device failure rate represents the
average number of failures per unit time. A constant failure rate is normally assumed during
the useful lifetime period of device. Failure rates can be obtained from theoretical
calculations or from field experience [76].
Failure rates are very useful in predicting reliability characteristics, but do not tell the whole
story about whether a device will be available when called upon to perform. Thus, it is
required to consider unavailability. Unavailability is the fraction of time a device cannot
perform its required task.
Available literature in reliability describes how to calculate unavailability from a failure
rate [3].

q

T
T

 T
MTBF MTTF

where:
q : Unavailability

 : Constant failure rate
T Average down-time per failure

MTTF 

1



is the Mean Time to Failure

MTBF is the Mean Time Between Failures
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Each failure causes downtime T. Therefore the system is unavailable for time T out of total
time MTBF. The fraction of time the system is not available is therefore

T
[76] .
MTBF

Table 7 shows the reliability data used in this dissertation to perform the analysis [76] .
Table 7. Reliability Data for Protection Schemes

Component

Unavailability x 106

Relay hardware

100

Relay applied properly

100

Current transformer (per phase)

10

Voltage transformer (per phase)

10

Circuit breaker

300

DC power supply

50

Leased telephone line

1000

Analog microwave equipment

200

Tone equipment

100

Microwave transmission channel

100

Fiber optic channel

100

Multiplexing fiber optic transceiver

100

Modem

30

Simple fiber optic transceiver

10
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Impact of Protection System Structure and/or redundancies on
Dependability/Security
The impact of the pilot protection scheme structures, as well as redundancy in various parts
of the system, on the protection system reliability is quantified in this section.
To this end, probability of various paths in event tree diagrams are calculated. A path can
occur, if all the events in that path occur. Considering that all the paths are mutually
exclusive, the probability of a particular system outcome is calculated by summating the
probability associated with each path leading to that outcome. The specific outcome could
be system failure, success, mal-function or any other protection system mode. Clearly, the
probability of each outcome depends on the paths leading to that outcome and the
probability associated with events constituting each path.
Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip (PUTT)
The first scheme to be considered is the PUTT scheme introduced in the previous sections.
The reliability results for this scheme are illustrated in Figure 34.
Several observations can be made from the results:


For a given configuration, the probability of the failure state is greatly affected by
those events that, when occur, take the system to the failure state, regardless of the
other events. The larger the number of such events (denoted as failing events), the
higher the probability of a failure state. It can be observed that the number of failing
events in the “single relay and single channel” is more than the other five
configurations and so this configuration has the highest probability of failure, both
in case of internal and external faults.
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Redundancy decreases the number of failing events and as such, configurations (b),
(c) and (f) are less likely to fail. The number of failing events in (b) are slightly
more than (c) in external faults resulting in a higher likelihood of failure.



In the case of internal faults, the failing events are protection failures not the
channel failures. Therefore, configurations that are made more robust to the
protection failures; i.e. (b) and (f), have the lowest failure probability.



The probability of state “SD”; i.e. delayed clearance of the internal fault, on the
other hand, depends on the channel health. If the channel fails, the clearance of
internal fault would be delayed. Therefore, configurations (c) and (f) with
redundancy in channel, have less probability for reaching the “SD” mode.



Fiber optic channels (d) and (e) have less complexity than microwave channels and
therefore have better performance in channel-related modes such as “SD”.
Configuration (d) is even simpler than (e) and has a lower “SD” probability.



The results indicate that this is a highly secure scheme as no malfunction occurs in
case of internal faults.
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Figure 34. Dependability/Security results for PUTT scheme.
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Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme (DCB)
Reliability diagrams for this scheme are shown in Figure 35. The following points are
highlighted about this figure:


Unlike PUTT, DCB scheme is subject to mal-function (MF) if the channel fails.



Schemes with more reliable channels like (c), (d), and (e) are less susceptible to
malfunction.



Configuration (f) has the worst status in terms of mal-function. The reason for this
is that, any failure of either channel could stop the block signal and result in malfunction. It should be noted that operation of each relay could open the breaker
(relay contacts are tied to perform “or” function). It might be favorable to “and” the
relay contacts to ensure more security in case of external faults, however, it would
decrease dependability, resulting in more “F” states.

Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB)
Figure 36 illustrates the reliability indices for DCUB.


In this scheme, “SD” is expected as activation of “lock out” signal will change the
scheme to a conventional distance framework with associated zone 2 time delay.



Mal-function depends on the channel status and configuration with more reliable
channels like (c), (d), and (e) show a higher tendency towards malfunction.



The malfunction is avoided if the fault clearance takes more than 150ms to be
completed and therefore the scheme has better general performance than DCB in
terms of mal-function.



Unlike the PUTT that always has a delayed response (SD) when the channel fails;
DCUB has delayed tripping when channel is faulty, only if the protection fails to
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clear the fault within 150ms window. Hence, DCUB has a better performance
against delayed tripping.


Protection failure in clearing internal faults (F) is related to the protection
availability. Configurations (b) and (f) with redundant relays are therefore less
likely to fall into “F” mode.
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Figure 35. Dependability/Security results for DCB scheme
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Figure 36. Dependability/Security results for DCUB scheme.
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Summary
Pilot schemes differ widely in the communication media, and in the logic used for the fault
detection as well as authentication of the received signal.
In this chapter, event trees were used to give a quantitative analysis and comparison of pilot
protection schemes. Even though the unavailability of individual components are
approximate values, event tree analysis gives useful “order of magnitude” results. These
results, especially when used in comparison with each other and with a graphical interface,
illuminate how various system structures and redundancies would affect the performance
of protection. Some of the results are as follows:


Blocking systems tend to be more dependable, while transfer-trip systems are more
secure.



The unblocking system combines the dependability of blocking systems with the
security of the transfer-trip systems, providing a highly reliable directional pilot
relaying system for transmission lines.



The unblocking scheme shows less tendency to delayed tripping in case of channel
failures.



A large number of components in series results in poor reliability. It can be seen
that in every scheme, fiber optic channels, and especially dedicated fibers have
better performance than the others in channel-related failures. This is due to the

103

simplicity of the fiber optics media, due to less series components required for the
channel success.
The results and conclusions can assist both utilities and manufacturers in making educated
and substantiated decisions regarding system design and implementation. Results of study
carried out in this chapter will be used in chapter 6 in determining the impact of protection
schemes on asset management.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS

Application of FCL in Sporn Substation, West Virginia
This section is mainly focused on the application of a SFCL based on High Temperature
Superconductor (HTS) in the American Electric Power (AEP) 138kV transmission grid
[23]. The particular type of SFCL considered for this application is “Matrix Fault Current
Limiter” (MFCL) and is presently under development by SuperPower Inc. and Nexans
Superconductors GmbH [23].
Superpower Inc. and Nexans SuperConductors GmbH partnered to develop and
demonstrate a High Temperature Superconducting (HTS) Fault Current Limiter (FCL) for
utility transmission voltage level applications. This device employs technology that offers
modular features that enable the scale-up to transmission voltage levels of 138 kV. In
conjunction with Nexans’ Melt-Cast Processed (MCP) BSCCO-2212 HTS elements, the
MFCL provides a solution which is more economical than many conventional solutions to
breaker over-duty problems [77].
Figure 37 shows a substation of the American Electric Power (AEP) grid in West Virginia.
The high current problem is originated by the auto-transformer 𝑇3 , which ties the 345 kV
portion of the switchyard to the 138 kV portion. This tie is beneficial to the operation of
the system during normal operation, but the transformer contributes an additional 13 kA at
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the 138 kV bus during fault conditions. This puts 9 breakers of the substation, as indicted
in the figure, in an over-duty situation.

Figure 37. Potential MFCL application [23].
Chapter two gave a good review and comparison of current reduction techniques and
devices used in different areas and situations based on the operating conditions, and desired
levels of reliability and security. An effective economical and technical comparison
between the above alternatives to solve the fault current over-duty problem at transmission
level is reported in [24]. The comparison shows that SFCL is a cost-effective solution that
besides a good performance in limiting the fault current at the very first cycle, it also offers
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the benefit of enhancing the system reliability. A SFCL performs this function by reducing
the stress on power equipment and preventing unnecessary outages.
Among solutions given in [24], the substation in Figure 37 currently employs a sequential
tripping scheme to cope with high fault currents. In order to do this, breakers 𝐸3 and 𝐸,
which have sufficient rating, are tripped first if a fault is detected on Lines #1 to #4. This
removes transformer 𝑇3 ’s contribution to the fault so that the affected over-duty breaker
can safely open and isolate the fault. This sequential breaker scheme solves the problem,
but has the disadvantage of delaying the fault clearing by adding 𝐸3 and 𝐸 breakers in the
trip sequence. It also results in unnecessarily removing the normal 𝑇3 load current to
portions of the system that were not affected by the fault.
An alternative solution is to keep 𝑇3 connected during the fault, but limit its current with
a FCL [78]. American Electric Power (AEP; Columbus, Ohio, U.S.) and a team consisting
of SuperPower Inc. (Schenectady, New York, U.S.), Nexans SuperConductors GmbH
(Hürth, Germany) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL; Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
U.S.) have made it a priority to address fault current over-duty problems at the transmission
voltage levels of 138-kV and higher [79].
Figure 37 shows how the addition of a MFCL in series with transformer T3 could resolve
the problem without resorting to the sequential breaker trip scheme. This location is also
in agreement with the results published in [45] that reviews all possible locations for using
fault current limiter in a substations and recommends that in a 1.5 breaker arrangement,
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installing FCL’s in series with critical lines would have the highest positive impact on fault
level reduction.
Here the MFCL is transparent to the system, and transformer 𝑇3 supplies load current from
the 345 kV system to the 138 kV system. Under fault conditions, the MFCL transits to the
high impedance state to limit the contribution of T3 to the fault, allowing the existing
breakers to clear the fault without having to open breakers 𝐸3 or 𝐸 first.
In following sections we deal with this application and, in quantitative terms, address the
reliability of the above scheme and compare the two cases of using the sequential breaker
trip scheme and using a FCL.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Due to switching nature of power substations, we should use special methods that can take
into account these switching actions and their effects on the system. Because of this reason,
reliability assessment of substations is usually done using failure modes and effects
analysis [80]. The basis of this method is to identify whether the failure of a component or
combination of components causes the failure of the load point of interest. If it does, the
event is counted as a load point failure event. Otherwise, it is disregarded at least as far as
the load point of interest is concerned. The consequence of a given failure event is then
identified according to the severity of the failure.
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In this method, all events that contribute to unavailability of any given load point are
recognized and recorded for that load point. Then for the event 𝑖, occurrence rate 𝜆𝑖 , outage
time 𝑟𝑖 , and unavailability 𝑈𝑖 due to that event are calculated.
Each event i can be either a fault in one component or overlapping outage of two or more
components. For instance the event where a short circuit happens in breaker 1 and
transformer 3 is open (due to maintenance).
Equations 3 to 5 are, respectively, used to calculate the expected failure rate, average
outage duration and average annual outage time associated with the overlapping outage of
two components 1 and 2.

 pp 

12 ( r1  r2 )
 12 (r1  r2 )
1  1r1  2 r2

rpp 

when i ri  1

(3)

r1 r2
r1  r2

(4)

U pp   pp . rpp  12 r1r2

(5)

Where 𝜆1 , 𝑟1, 𝜆2 , and 𝑟2 are failure rates and outage times of components 1 and 2,
respectively.
As all the events are assumed to be mutually exclusive, they are effectively in series from
a reliability point of view, meaning that occurrence of one of them would result in
unavailability of the load. The indices for the studied load point can therefore be evaluated
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using Equations for series events- equations 6 to 8- in which 𝜆𝑖 and 𝑟𝑖 are, respectively,
the average failure rate and average outage time associated with the ith event.

 s   i

(6)

i

U s   i . ri
i

rs 

Us

s

(7)

 .r


i

i

i

(8)

i

i

Where s , U s , and rs are the load point (or system) average failure rate, average
unavailability and average outage time, respectively.
Study Results
Following are the assumptions that were made in this study. These assumptions are the
most possible realistic ones, as to the best knowledge of the author. They are not, however,
restrictive and similar results are obtained when they are altered.
1- In the absence of two transformers T3 and T4 , generator G5 in Figure 37 may not be
able to supply the full load. In such circumstances (only unit G5 in service), unit G5 could
become unstable depending on conditions such as the unit readiness to supply the loads,
generating capacity status at the moment, speed of the generator response to the change in
the load value, protection clearing time, etc. This event is, therefore, designated as
“potential instability” which implies that it could potentially lead to system instability.
Whether or not instability occurs, is determined by the probability 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏 defined as
follows:
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PInstab 

No. of instabilit ies when "only G 5 in service"

(9)

Total No. of exposure to " only G 5 in service"in the period of study

The above probability could easily be obtained using the historical data recorded in
event/fault recorders in the substation.
If we define event “A” as “ G5 becomes instable when only G5 remains in the circuit”
and event “ B ” as the event that “only G5 remains in the circuit”, possible outcomes of
event “𝐵” are “𝐴” and “𝐴̅ “ (“𝐴̅ “ being the case that G5 doesn’t becomes instable when
only G5 remains in the circuit) , therefore the rate of event “𝐴” is:

 ( A)   ( B)  Pinstab

(10)

2- In the conventional sequential scheme, if breakers E or E 3 fail to open to disconnect
T3 , some breakers maybe subject to over-duty. These cases are designated as “potential

C.B. blast” as they may or may not result in a real breaker blast. PBlast defines this
probability as:

PBlast 

No. of a specific breaker blast while E or E 3 fails to open when they should
TotalNo. of times that E or E 3 fails to open when they should
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(11)

Frequency of the event “ C ” defined as “A specific breaker blasts when E or E 3 fails to
open when they should” is then:

 (C )   ( D)  PBlast

(12)

Where “ D ” is the event that E or E 3 fail to open when they should.
3- Transformer T4 cannot carry the full load current. Therefore in case that only T4
remains in the circuit, all loads are curtailed due to the overload of this transformer.
4- Transformer T3 can carry the full load current for the duration of the switching time.
Switching time is the time required to perform the switching action in substation to isolate
the affected component or to transfer load to the healthy feeders. This time is typically
selected to be one hour.

5- Combination “G5+One transformer” can carry the full load current without overload
limitations.

6- Transformers T3 and T4 are capable of carrying the full load current without overload
limitations.
Based on the above assumptions, comparative studies were conducted using the above
method to examine the reliability impact of incorporating the MFCL in the transmission
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substation. Figure 38 and 39 show the effect of MFCL on the failure rate and unavailability
of individual load points. In these figures L1 to L4 are lines #1 to #4 and customer plant is
unit G5 in Figure 37 [22].
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Figure 38. Load point failure rates without and with MFCL for 1:L1 2:L2 3:L3 4:L4 5:
Customer Plant.
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Figure 39. Load point unavailability without and with MFCL for 1:L1 2:L2 3:L3 4:L4 5:
Customer Plant.
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As expected, it is seen from these figures that using MFCL would decrease the failure rates
and unavailability. It can be seen from the results that the maximum unavailability
improvement is achieved for the customer plant with 0.0572 hrs/yr. This is due to the
adverse effect that sequential trip has on the continuity of service to the customer plant and
that MFCL prevents the unnecessary outages in this regard.
Potential instability of the substation without and with MFCL is illustrated in Figure 40. In
these figures, “O/yr” is short for “occurrence per year” and indicates the rate of the events.
In this case, MFCL reduces the potential instability from 0.0288 to 4.4466e-7. This is a
considerable improvement with respect to stability and is mainly because the existing
sequential scheme jeopardizes system stability by disconnecting the transformer 𝑇4 and as
such 𝐺5 would have a lesser chance to remain stable.
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Figure 40. Potential instability without and with MFCL.
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Figure 41 compares the bus isolation probability for the two cases of without and with
MFCL.
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Figure 41. Bus isolation without and with MFCL.

In some cases, such as when breaker E 3 is faulty, transformer T3 continues to send current
to the fault. In these cases if the back-up protection of T3 does not operate in time to
disconnect the transformer, the transformer may become damaged. Therefore, these cases
are designated as “potential T3 damage”. It is obvious that when MFCL is used, T3 is
prevented from getting damaged because of the limited current and so there is no “potential
T3 damage” in case of MFCL. Figure 42 shows the frequency of these cases without and

with MFCL.
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Figure 42. Potential T3 damage without and with MFCL.

Figure 43 shows the frequency of “Potential Circuit Breaker blast”. It should be noted that
this event, although not so common, once it occurs it impose a tremendous amount of extra
cost and outage time on the system.
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Figure 43. Potential CB Blast without and with MFCL.
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Another interesting study that can be conducted is to examine the variation in expected
failure rate due to changes in PInstab for different load points with and without MFCL. This
comparison is shown in Figures 44 through 48. As expected, failure rate increases as the
PInstab increases. The results also indicate that sensitivity of λ with respect to PInstab is less

when using MFCL compared to that of without MFCL. This indicates that when MFCL is
used, station reliability is not much affected by operating condition of the substation.
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Figure 44. L1 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with
MFCL
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Figure 45.L2 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with
MFCL.
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Figure 46. L3 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL.
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Figure 47. L4 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with
MFCL.
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Figure 48. L5 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL.
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Application of FCL in Wind Power Plants
In the coming years there will be more and more wind power plants connected to the
electric grid. The integration of wind turbine generators, and large number of induction
generators in wind power plants dramatically increases the fault current level beyond the
capacity of existing protection devices [39]. The system stability and voltage quality may
be corrupted. So the power system switchgear and power system protection should be
carefully designed to obtain a secure operation of the system. Fault Current Limiters
(FCL’s) regulate the amount of current moving through the transmission and distribution
systems under abnormal conditions. In [81], [82], and [83] it is shown that Fault Current
Limiters (FCL’s) suppress this negative influence of DG on distribution systems. The use
of superconducting fault current limiter (SFCL) reduces fault current level at the stator side
and improve the fault ride through capability of the system [40]. In this section, application
of a type of FCL called Superconductive Shielded Core Reactor (SSCR6) is studied in a
wind power plant. Computer simulation examines the effectiveness of SSCR in reducing
the fault current level as well as provision for transient stability without affecting the
normal operation of the system.
In following sections of this chapter, we will model a SSCR in Simulink. Since most
generators used in wind power plants are induction generators, we will then develop a

6

Described in Chapter two
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model for simulation of induction generator in the Simulink. Using these two models we
can simulate the performance of SSCR in a given wind power plant.

Simulation of SSCR
In [51] a SSCR is developed and tested in the circuit shown in Figure 49. The same circuit
is used in this paper to simulate the operation of SSCR using a new model and compare it
with experimental results presented in [51] .

Figure 49. Circuit used in simulation of SSCR [51].

From the circuit shown in Figure 49:
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i

e  (VL  VSSCR )
r

(13)

VL  RL .i

(14)

Where e is Voltage of the power source, VL is Voltage across the load RL , VSSCR is the
voltage across the SSCR, r is the internal resistance of the source, and i is the current in
the circuit.
Equation (13) could be simulated in SIMULINK using the block diagram of Figure 50 [84].
The block "SSCR" in the figure represents the superconductive limiter. Figure 51 shows
details of the SSCR block. This figure simply denotes the relationship between ISSCR and
VSSCR; i.e. current through the SSCR and voltage 𝑒 across it, respectively. Despite the
simplicity of the proposed model, it has sufficient accuracy to predict the behavior of a
SSCR in limiting short circuit currents. The accuracy of the proposed model is then
examined using the experimental data published in [51].
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Figure 50. Block diagram used in simulation.

Figure 51. Inside the SSCR block.
It can be seen from Figure 51 that VSSCR consists of four parameters e1, e2, e3 and e4. e1
and e4 are voltage drops due to the resistance and leakage reactance of the copper coil of
SSCR, respectively. These two terms always exist regardless of the mode of operation of
SSCR. In other words, whether or not the SSCR works in superconductive region, it has
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the resistive voltage drop and leakage voltage drop associated with the copper coil.
Therefore e1 and e4 are directly added to give the final voltage drop. The other two voltage
drops, i.e., e2 and e3 do not exist during the normal operation of SSCR. They appear only
when the SSCR loses its shielding behavior as the result of a fault condition. e2 denotes
the voltage drop corresponding to the resistance of the superconductor and e3 is the voltage
drop across the reactance of the unshielded copper coil. As a matter of fact, the main
function of SSCR is to expose the inductance of the copper coil when a fault occurs.
Therefore, e3 is the main component in limiting the fault current. Since e2 and e3 do appear
only during fault conditions, they are multiplied by a blocking signal prior to summation
to give the final voltage drop. The blocking signal is multiplied by e2 and e3 and blocks
them by outputting a zero when the current in the circuit is below the critical level. When
the current passes this level, i.e. when the fault occurs, the output of this block jumps to
“1”, hence allowing e2 and e3 to contribute to the final VSSCR. Block “s” in Figure 51
generates this signal.
Figure 52 shows the output of block “s”. It is clear that “s” is a simple switch with “0”
output for currents below the critical current of superconductor and jumps to “1” when the
current passes the threshold. The reason for using a hysteresis behavior for “s” is that when
the current passing through the SSCR increases and makes the device to quench, it remains
quenched and doesn’t return to its superconducting state even if the current falls below the
critical value. Therefore, once the output of “s” jumps to “1” it must remain at this level
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and not return to “0” at any time. This irreversible behavior of SSCR is well simulated
using the hysteresis path shown in Figure 52.

Figure 52. Output of block "s" in Figure 51.
Actually, in reality, at some time after the fault is detected and cleared, the SSCR returns
to its superconductive state. Inclusion of this "reset time" is beyond the scope of this study.
The model of this section simulates the macroscopic behavior of the SSCR for Grid study
only. It should be noted that in order to simulate the exact behavior of the SSCR during
quench the step function in the output of the block "s" should be replaced by an exponential
function to take into account the effects of penetration depth, magnetic and thermal
diffusion, and a possible transition into the flux flow state during quench.
Figure 53 shows the experimental and simulation results for the circuit. It can clearly be
seen that the simulation results are in good agreement with those obtained from experiment
in [51].
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It should be noted that the new model receives the current passing through SSCR as input
and gives the voltage across it as output. This is demonstrated in Figure 54.

(a)

(b)

Figure 53. Limiting characteristics of SSCR: (a) experimental [51] (b) simulation .
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Figure 54. Input-output status of the proposed model for SSCR.
Simulation of Induction Generator
Equations of an induction machine in time domain are as below [85] :
Stator voltage equations.
𝑑𝜆𝑎𝑠

𝑣𝑎𝑠 = 𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑠 +

𝑑𝜆𝑏𝑠

𝑣𝑏𝑠 = 𝑖𝑏𝑠 𝑟𝑠 +

𝑣𝑐𝑠 = 𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑟𝑠 +

(15)

𝑑𝑡

(16)

𝑑𝑡

𝑑𝜆𝑐𝑠

(17)

𝑑𝑡

Rotor voltage equations.
𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑟 +

𝑣𝑏𝑟 = 𝑖𝑏𝑟 𝑟𝑟 +

𝑣𝑐𝑟 = 𝑖𝑐𝑟 𝑟𝑟 +

𝑑𝜆𝑎𝑟

(18)

𝑑𝑡

𝑑𝜆𝑏𝑟

(19)

𝑑𝑡

𝑑𝜆𝑐𝑟

(20)

𝑑𝑡

Flux linkage equations.
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Flux linkage equations of the stator and rotor windings in matrix form are as below:
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝜆𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑠𝑠
𝑠
[ 𝑎𝑏𝑐
] = [ 𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝐿𝑟𝑠
𝜆𝑟

𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑠𝑟
]
[
]
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑟𝑟

(21)

Where
𝜆𝑎𝑏𝑐
= [𝜆𝑎𝑠
𝑠

𝜆𝑏𝑠

𝜆𝑐𝑠 ]𝑇

(22)

𝜆𝑎𝑏𝑐
= [𝜆𝑎𝑟
𝑟

𝜆𝑏𝑟

𝜆𝑐𝑟 ]𝑇

(23)

𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝑖𝑎𝑠

𝑖𝑏𝑠

𝑖𝑐𝑠 ]𝑇

(24)

𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝑖𝑎𝑟

𝑖𝑏𝑟

𝑖𝑐𝑟 ]𝑇

(25)

The submatrices of stator and rotor winding inductances are :

𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑠𝑠

𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠
= [ 𝐿𝑠𝑚
𝐿𝑠𝑚

𝐿𝑠𝑚
𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠
𝐿𝑠𝑚

𝐿𝑠𝑚
𝐿𝑠𝑚 ]
𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠

(26)

𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑟𝑟

𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟
= [ 𝐿𝑟𝑚
𝐿𝑟𝑚

𝐿𝑟𝑚
𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝑟𝑚

𝐿𝑟𝑚
𝐿𝑟𝑚 ]
𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟

(27)

𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)
𝑎𝑏𝑐 𝑇
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐
𝑠𝑟 = [𝐿𝑟𝑠 ] = 𝐿𝑠𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 −

[𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 +

2𝜋
3
2𝜋
3

𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 +
)

2𝜋
3

) 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 −

𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)

) 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 −
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2𝜋
3

𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃 +
)

2𝜋
3
2𝜋
3

𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)

)
)

(28)
]

Where 𝜃 is angle of the rotor. Applying park transformation in stationary reference frame
to the voltage and flux linkage equations will time remove time dependency of the
equations and result in equations (29) to (35) [85]. Figure 55 schematically shows this
reference frame with respect to the stator and rotor windings.
q-axis
bs

Wr

br

ar
`

as-axis

cs

cr

d-axis

Figure 55. Stationary reference frame spatial diagram

1 𝑑

𝑣𝑞𝑠 = 𝜔

𝑏

𝑑𝑡

1 𝑑

𝑣𝑑𝑠 = 𝜔

𝑏

𝑑𝑡

𝛹𝑞𝑠 + 𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑞𝑠

(29)

𝛹𝑑𝑠 + 𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑠

(30)
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1 𝑑

𝑣𝑜𝑠 = 𝜔

𝑑𝑡

𝑏

𝛹𝑜𝑠 + 𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑜𝑠

1 𝑑

𝑣 ′ 𝑞𝑟 = 𝜔

𝑏 𝑑𝑡

1 𝑑

𝑣 ′ 𝑑𝑟 = 𝜔

𝑏

𝑑𝑡

1 𝑑

𝑣 ′ 𝑜𝑟 = 𝜔

𝑏

𝑑𝑡

(31)

𝜔

′
𝛹 ′ 𝑞𝑟 − 𝜔𝑟 𝛹 ′ 𝑑𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟′ 𝑖𝑞𝑟

(32)

𝑏

𝜔

′
𝛹 ′ 𝑑𝑟 + 𝜔𝑟 𝛹 ′ 𝑞𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟′ 𝑖𝑑𝑟

(33)

′
𝛹 ′ 𝑜𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟′ 𝑖𝑜𝑟

(34)

𝑏

𝛹𝑞𝑠
𝑥𝑚
0
0 𝑖𝑞𝑠
0
0
𝑥𝑙𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚
𝛹𝑑𝑠
0
0 𝑖𝑑𝑠
𝑥𝑙𝑠 + 𝑥𝑚 0
𝑥𝑚
0
𝛹𝑜𝑠
0
𝑥𝑙𝑠
0 𝑖𝑜𝑠
0
0
0
=
′
′
′
𝑥
0 𝑖𝑞𝑟
𝛹 𝑞𝑟
0
0
𝑚
0 𝑥 𝑙𝑟 + 𝑥𝑚
′
0
0
𝑥𝑚
𝑥 ′ 𝑙𝑟 + 𝑥𝑚 0 𝑖𝑑𝑟
0
𝛹 ′ 𝑑𝑟
′
0
𝑥 𝑙𝑟 ] [𝑖 ′ ]
0
0
0
0
[𝛹 ′ 𝑜𝑟 ] [
𝑜𝑟

(35)

Where the primed rotor quantities are their referred values to the stator side, and
𝛹( ) = 𝜔𝑏 𝜆( ) in all equations.
By defining mutual flux linkages as:

 mq  X m (iqs  iqr' ),

(3)

(36)

and

 md  X m (ids  idr' ),

(37)

(4)
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the mutual flux linkages of the machine can be expressed as:

 qs  X ls  iqs  mq

(5)

(38)

 ds  X ls  ids   md

(6)

(39)

 qr'  X lr'  iqr'  mq

(7)

(40)

 dr'  X lr'  idr'  md

(8)

(41)

Solving the above equations for currents yields:

iqs 

ids 

i 
'
qr

i 
'
dr

 qs   mq
X ls

 ds   mq
X ls

 qr'   mq
X lr'

 dr'   mq
X ls'

(9)

(42)

(10)

(43)

(11)

(44)

(12)

(45)
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Substituting (42) to (45) into (36) and (37) and rearranging terms would result in:

 qs

 mq  X M  (



 qr'

)

(13)


'
 md  X M  ( ds  dr' )

(14)

X ls

X lr'

(46)

and

X ls

X lr

(47)

Where
1
1
1
1


 '
XM
X m X ls X lr

(48)

(15)

It is now possible to rearrange the equations of the induction machine into a suitable form
for simulation. Substituting Equations (42)-(45) into voltage equations (29) to (34) and
rearranging the terms would result in:


 qs  b   vqs 




 ds  b   vds 



rs
( mq   qs )dt (16)
X ls


(49)


rs
( md   ds )dt (17)
X ls


(50)
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ios 

b
 vos  ios  rs dt
X ls 



 qr'   b   v qr' 

(18)

(51)


s '
r'
 dr  r' ( mq   qr )dt
b
X lr


(52)

(19)



'
dr



r '
rr'
 '
  b   v dr   qr  ' ( md   dr )dt
b
X lr



(20)

ior' 

b
  vor'  ior'  rr' dt
'
X lr

(21)

(53)

(54)

The torque equation is (considering P poles in the machine):

Tem 

3 P
( ds  iqs  qsids )
2 2b

(55)

The equation of the motion of the rotor is:

J

d rm
 Tem  Tmech  Tdamp
dt

(23)

(56)

In Equation (56), 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ is the externally applied mechanical torque and 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑝 is the
damping torque in the direction opposite to rotation. The value of 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ is negative for the
motoring condition, as in the case of a load torque and is positive for the generating
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condition, as in the case of an applied shaft torque from a prime mover. Equations (49) to
(56) give a proper simulation model that can be easily implemented in simulation programs
such as SIMULINK. Block diagrams of simulation of the above equations in SIMULINK
are given in Figures 56.
Based on the above discussion, the overall simulation of the induction generator presented
here receives the terminal voltage of the machine as input and calculates the generator
current as output. This input output status of the presented model is shown in Figure 57
(compare it with Figure 54 for SSCR).

(a) q-axis circuit
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(b) d-axis circuit

(c) o-axis circuit

(d) Developed torque and speed

Figure 56. Block diagram used in the simulation of induction generator.
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Figure 57. Input- output status of the presented induction generator model.

Inclusion of SSCR in Wind Power Plants
Figure 58 shows a typical wind power plant where an induction generator is used along
with a SSCR. In this figure, “C” represents the capacitor bank and “L” represents the
transmission line.

Figure 58. Test system used in the simulation.
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In order to simulate this system, the network equations should be derived first and used
with the two models presented above for the SSCR and the generator. Network equations
for the circuit shown in Figure 58 are presented by Equations (57) and (58).
vG  

1
 (iG  i SSCR ) dt
C

(24)

(57)

iL  

1
 (vc  v SSCR  v sys )dt
L

(25)

(58)

The block diagram in Figure 59 illustrates the computer simulation flow graph for the
circuit in Figure 58. In this block diagram the two previously discussed models for SSCR
and generator are used in addition to the network model Equations (57) and (58).

Figure 59. Computer simulation flow graph for the circuit of Figure 58.
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Using the SSCR and induction generator model in the block diagram of Figure 59, the test
system was simulated using SIMULINK. Point “F” in Figure 58 was subject to a singleline-to-ground fault as well as a three phase-to-ground fault and current responses were
examined in each case. In both cases the faults occur at t=4 sec. Figures 60 (a) and (b) show
the results for three-phases fault and Figures 60 (c) to (d) and 61 (a) to (d) illustrate the
results for single-line-to-ground fault. Since the generator is supplied via the infinite bus,
in the case of the three-phases-to-ground fault at “F”, the main supply to the generator is
short circuited by the fault and hence removed. In this case, the short circuit current appears
to decline automatically even without existence of SSCR, however, SSCR serves as a
limiting device that efficiently reduces the fault current at its peak level.
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(b)

(c)

(d)
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(a)

Figure 60. Three-phase fault at point F (a) iG phase a (b) iL phase a -- One Phase-to-ground fault (LG) at point F (c) iL phase a (d) iL
phase b

(b)

(c)

(d)
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(a)

Figure 61. Single-line-to-ground fault (LG) at point F (a) iL, phase c (b) iG, phase a (c) iG, phase b (d) iG, phase c .

Application of SFCL in Power Substations to Enhance Reliability
In order to examine the impact of employing SFCL on station reliability, all the
configuration shown in Figure 8 chapter 2 are used for this analysis. These arrangements
are repeated here in Figure 62 for easy reference. As noted earlier, SFCL would prevent
loads from being curtailed in case of a short circuit in the system. This implies that some
of the failure modes of substations which cause interruption of Load points in the absence
of SFCL, are eliminated when the SFCL is employed.
L2

L1

5

6

F CL

4

3

7

2

1

(a) single sectionalized bus arrangement
L1

L2

11

12

10
8

9

6

7

13

3

4

5
1

2

(b) breaker and a half
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13

FCL2

11

5

14

6

1

8

2

FC L1

9

3

10

4

10

12

L1

L2

(c) main and transfer bus system
L1

L2

10

6

11

7

8

F CL
a
9
b
5
3

4
2

1

(d) double bus system

Figure 62. Common configurations in switching substation.
Failure modes and effects has been used to study impact of using SFCL in various
substation arrangements and locations [14]. Table 1 in Appendix shows that SFCL
eliminates a large number of failure modes. Since the reliability indices of the entire
substation are determined through these failure modes, using SFCL improves the reliability
indices of substations, as it was expected [14].
The worth of employing SFCL is examined by comparing the reliability indices for two
cases. In the first case, the reliability indices associated with each station configuration are
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calculated without installing SFCL. In the second case, the reliability indices are calculated
in the presence of SFCL. The reliability data used in these calculations are shown in Table
8 [22] .
Table 8. Station Reliability Data [22]

Failure Rate (f/yr)

time

element

CB

repair

open
circuit

short
circuit

total

(hrs)

0.005

0.005

0.01

12

switching
time (hrs)

1

4

Disconnector
Switch

0.005

0.005

0.01

Bus

0.005

0.005

0.01

1
4
1

Table 2 in Appendix shows the study results associated with the station configurations
"main and transfer bus" shown in Figures 49.c. All the failure events affecting Load point
L1 are shown in the tables. Similar calculations could be conducted for “L2” due to the
symmetry of the circuits. Some of the failure events which were previously affecting Load
point L1 are eliminated by installing the SFCL. These failure modes have been highlighted
in the Appendix of this document and summarized in Table 9. The associated events are
therefore disregarded for the load point of interest.
In the results presented in this dissertation, overlapping forced outages up to second-order,
first order active failures and first-order active failures overlapping a stuck breaker are
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considered [14] . The probability that a breaker fails to open when required (stuck-breaker
probability) is assumed to be 0.1 for all cases. Moreover, the SFCL is assumed to be fully
reliable, i.e. failure rate of the SFCL is assumed to be zero.

Table 9. Events Eliminated due to Employing SFCL(s) in main and transfer bus system

Events Deleted Due to
Events
SFCL 1

SFCL 2

SFCL 1&2

9A

X

X

X

10A

X

X

11A

X

X

1A+11S

X

X

4A+11S

X

X

4A+10S

X

X
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Table 10. Reliability indices for bus arrangements without SFCL.
Bus Arrangement
Single Sectionalized
Bus
Breaker and a half
Main and Transfer
Double bus

λ (f/yr)

r (hours)

0.031000622

5.516126591

0.171003356

0.024001495
0.06750085
0.042500845

2.249994085
1.888926615
3.588247776

0.054003221
0.127504153
0.152503562

U (hours/yr)

Table 11. Reliability indices for bus arrangements with SFCL.
Bus Arrangement
Single Sectionalized
Bus
Breaker and a half
Main and Transfer
SFCL1
SFCL2
SFCL1 & SFCL2
Double bus

λ (f/yr)

r (hours)

U (hours/yr)

0.020000622

7.999918952

0.160003356

0.022501356

2.33333045

0.052503098

0.058000925
0.05750085
0.05150085
0.025000845

2.034521926
2.043520262
2.16509343
5.399960001

0.118004153
0.117504153
0.111504153
0.135003562

Tables 10 and 11 summarize the results of these calculations. It can be seen from the results
shown in these two tables that the most reliability improvement is achieved in case of a
“double bus system” with a “0.0175 f/yr” decrease in the average failure rate. This,
however, reaches its minimum variation in “breaker and a half” with a “0.0015 f/yr”
decrease.
It can be seen from the results of calculation that using SFCL in each case improves the
reliability indices. The impacts on the reliability indices vary for different configurations.
For the single sectionalized bus arrangement, the expected failure rate and the annual
outage time decreases from 0.3 to 0.20 f/yr and 0.171 to 0.16 hrs/yr, respectively, when
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SFCL is used. This improvement, however, is different for the case of breaker and a half
station configuration. The reliability improvement in this case is less compared with the
case of the single sectionalized bus arrangement. The decrease in the average failure rates
for these two configurations is in the order of 35.5% and 6.25%, respectively. The reason
for this is that one and a half station configuration is inherently more reliable than the single
sectionalized bus arrangement.
Comparing the reliability indices for different substation arrangements also shows that
“breaker and a half” is the most reliable one with a “0.054 hrs/yr” unavailability, while
“single sectionalized bus arrangement” is the least reliable with a “0.171 hrs/yr”
unavailability. This information is useful when selecting the substation arrangements
among available alternatives.
0.08

without SCFCL
with SCFCL(s)
with SCFCL1
with SCFCL2

0.07

λ (f/yr)

0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
1

2

3

4

Case study

Figure 63. Comparison of failure rates for various arrangements with and without SFCL:
(1) Main and transfer (2) Single sectionalized bus (3) Breaker and a half (4) Double bus..
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Figure 63 shows failure rate of load point L1 for the four configurations with and without
SFCL. Another interesting study that can be conducted is to examine the variation in
expected failure rate due to changes in stuck-breaker probability for different station
configurations with and without SFCL. This comparison is shown in Figure 64. Stuck
breaker is a situation in which a circuit breaker fails to operate even after receiving a
tripping signal from a relay or a switch. Stuck breaker can undermine the protection scheme
and can cause damage to machinery and is a danger to personnel. Common reasons for a
circuit breaker not opening are a disconnection in the trip circuit or a mechanical problem
with the circuit breaker.
As expected, failure rate increases as the stuck breaker probability increases. The results
also indicate that sensitivity of failure rate λ with respect to stuck breaker probability is
less when using SFCL compared to that without SFCL. This can clearly be seen as the
slope of the lines associated with the case with SFCL is less than that of the case without
SFCL. This is much more significant for single sectionalized bus arrangement and double
bus system shown with the horizontal lines. This indicates that when SFCL is used, station
reliability is not much affected by high stuck breaker probability.
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Figure 64. Variation of λ with respect to stuck breaker probability : (a) Single
sectionalized bus arrangement (b) Main and transfer bus system (c) Breaker and a half
system (d) Double bus system.
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Other Studies on Reliability Improvements by Using Fault Current Limiters
Literatures on reliability impacts of FCL’s can be divided into two main categories: those
focusing on proposing models for the FCL as a new element in the power system, and those
working on modeling the impacts/behaviors of FCl’s in the power grid. Studies in the first
category are helpful in providing models for the system incorporating the new element, but
their values are limited by how accessible it is to build up the proposed model in the reality.
It is especially important to be able to find/calculate the recommended model parameters
using in-field data and non-destructive tests.
[86] proposes a Markov model for operation of SFCL shown in Figure 65. This model is
then used to calculate the reliability indices of a three bus system with the SFCL installed,
and comperes it with the non-FCL case. [87] and [88] use this model to asses reliability of
a distribution system with the SFCL installed.
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Figure 65. Six-state model of SFCL recommended in [86].
Parameters of this model are as below:
𝜆12 : Failure rate at which resistance zero state can be changed into the quench state in
normal condition
𝜆21 : Repair rate at which the extra resistance by quench can be changed into zero resistance
in normal condition
𝜆13 : Failure rate at which SFCL with zero resistance can be separated from network in
normal condition
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𝜆31 : Repair rate at which SFCL with zero resistance can be reconnected to network in
normal condition
𝜆23 : Failure rate at which SFCL with extra resistance can be separated from network in
normal condition
𝜆45 :

Failure rate at which perfect operation is interrupted as SFCL partly limits fault

current in abnormal condition
𝜆54 :

Repair rate at which perfect operation is recovered from partial fault current limit

in abnormal condition
𝜆46 : Failure rate at which perfect operation is interrupted as SFCL is separated from
network in abnormal condition
𝜆64 : Repair rate at which perfect operation is recovered from disconnection in abnormal
network
𝜆56 : Failure rate at which SFCL with extra resistance can be separated from network in
abnormal condition
𝜆42 : Failure rate at which SFCL can't recover superconductivity in normal after perfect
operation in abnormal
𝜆14 , 𝜆25 , 𝜆36 : Transition rates from normal condition (I) to abnormal condition (II)
𝜆41 , 𝜆52 , 𝜆63 : Transition rates from abnormal condition (II) to normal condition (I)
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The illustrated model in Figure 65 is a very detailed model and could be used to give
accurate results and indices, but it encounters a large number of transition rates and
parameters that aren’t normally available. Such data would need very detailed information
and historical data regarding the system under study.
[10] uses the Markov model of Figure 66 to model the operation of a SFCL. States 1 and 3
indicate that the SFCL operates perfectly under normal and abnormal conditions,
respectively, where abnormal conditions mean that a fault has occurred in the network.
State 2 is determined as the operation of the SFCL that fails under normal conditions. The
main source of this problem is the cooling devices. State 4 results from the fault of the
superconductor or module when a fault occurs in the network. The value of 𝜆13 is the
success rate where the SFCL operates perfectly after detecting a fault. The value of 𝜆14 is
the failure rate where the SFCL fails to limit fault current in a network, and 𝜆41 is the repair
rate from State 4 to State 1. The value of 𝜆31 is the repair rate of the network. After a fault
in the network is cleared, the SFCL in State 3 can be restored to normal State 1. The
transition rates of 𝜆12 and 𝜆21 are the failure rate caused by the SFCL itself and the repair
rate of the SFCL itself without any fault in a network, respectively.
Although this model uses less parameters than the model of Figure 65, it still needs some
data that are not easy to find/calculate in real system operations. There are also confusions
regarding definitions of some of the rates; e.g. 𝜆31 is the rate in which SFCL goes from
state 3 to sate 1; i.e. from limiting state back to the normal state; in other words the recovery
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rate of the superconductor. System repair can start during this transition or after, however
𝜆31 is the SFCL recovery rate and not the system repair rate as shown in [10] .

Figure 66. Four-state reliability model for SFCL.
Since FCL’s and specially SFCL’s are still in R&D phases and with limited practical
applications and data available, usage of such detailed models will be less realistic and
most likely delayed until more data becomes industrially available on operation and
application of these devices in the future decades .
As stated earlier, second category of works have tried to address the reliability impact of
SFCL by modeling the behavior of the device in the system without focusing on the model
of the SFCL itself. Many studies have been carried out concerning different type of FCL’s
[4] ; their structural designs [5] , [6]; and their impact on static and dynamic behavior of
faulted systems [7] and [8] . In [9], no particular substation configuration is assumed, and
the FCL is located in a distribution network.
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A big portion of this group of research works have used cut set techniques such as failure
modes and effects analysis to address the reliability impacts of the FCL devices [36] , [89]
, [22] and [15].
Failure modes and effects has a huge advantage in saving the calculation time by just
inspecting a certain cut-sets/events of the system leading to the desired outcomes, instead
of looking at all of the events/cases as in other methods such as Markov or event tree/fault
tree [3]. Also, the input parameters to this method are mostly failure rates and
switching/repair times that can be readily calculated or estimated with good degree of
accuracy through practical data available from day to day operation or from devices such
as event or fault recorders. However, using this technique in finding reliability of FCL
devices, only gives us that part of reliability improvements caused by FCL in preventing
the loads from being curtailed. While this is a good advantage and allows us to calculate
improvements in indices such as “Expected Energy Not Supplied” (EENS), “Expected
Load Not Supplied”, (ELNS), Capacity Outage Probability Table [14] , etc., this doesn’t
give us the whole reliability improvement caused by using FCL’s. Main reliability
improvement comes from the main responsibility of FCL which is limiting the fault
current, and that doesn’t necessarily lead to prevention of load outage. This becomes
evident by looking at the works that use failure modes and effects analysis to address
reliability enhancements due to FCL’s, and seeing that using FCL eliminates just a few
number of cases leading to the load outage [15]. Therefore using failure modes and effects
analysis would underestimate the reliability enhancement caused by using FCL. In order
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to fully compute the effects of FCL in improving reliability, there should be a method to
calculate the effects of fault current levels in the power system reliability. FCL’s limit the
fault current in the power system and reduce the stress on circuit breakers, protection
system and all other elements of the system. In order to capture all these effects, there
should be a model that addresses the direct effects of fault current levels on the
system/component reliability levels.
There is a second group of these categories that tries to address the fault limiting behavior
of FCL’s in the reliability calculations. In [10] Monte Carlo simulation method has been
used along with the Markov model of [86] to find the reduction in stress caused by using
FCL’s. [10] first uses Monte Carlo method to apply faults in various locations of the
system and calculates the fault currents in various components and protection systems.
Then calculates the failure probability of protection system in clearing the fault, based on
an assumed failure density function for the protection system. [10] uses the following
formula to calculate failure probability of the protection system in clearing the faults:
𝑃(𝐹𝑗 ) = ∑𝑖 𝑃(𝐼𝑗𝑖 ). 𝑃(𝐹𝑗 |𝐼𝑗𝑖 )

(59)

Where 𝑃(𝐼𝑗𝑖 ) is the probability that 𝑖𝑡ℎ level of fault current passes through protection
device 𝑗, and 𝑃(𝐹𝑗 |𝐼𝑗𝑖 ) is the conditional probability that the protection device 𝑗 fails, given
that that 𝑖𝑡ℎ level of fault current passes through it [10]. 𝑃(𝐹𝑗 |𝐼𝑗𝑖 ) is the conditional failure
probability density function of the protection system and is very hard to find in practice,
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and not easy to generalize given the huge variety of protection system types and their
characteristics. This approach also has the disadvantage of using the Markov model of [86]
and the associated problems mentioned earlier.
[90] uses a similar method to calculate stress on circuit breakers and appreciate the role of
FCL in mitigating these stresses in power system. It uses the function given in Figure 67
as failure probability of circuit breaker in interrupting a fault current. Again, finding this
probability density function is not easy in practice and needs lots of on-field/historical data
resulting from tests or operations that aren’t normally available.

Figure 67. Failure probability of circuit breaker vs. fault current magnitude.
Another big disadvantage associated with all these methods is that Monte Carlo method
(or any other simulation method) need extremely large amount of calculation time that
usually increases exponentially as the size of the system under study increases.
In the next chapter, we develop an analytical model that considers the impact of fault
current levels in the reliability evaluation of power systems, and therefore allows to take
into consideration the benefits of FCL in reducing fault current levels and hence mitigating
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the stress on power system components. This way larger benefit of FCL in enhancing the
reliability will be revealed and calculated: not just its minor role of keeping the loads
connected, but also its major role of reducing stress and fault-caused damages to the power
system components and elements and the entire system in general.
This developed model will be available using normal operational/historical data relating to
the usual power equipment, and unlike Monte Carlo or other simulation methods it does
not employ huge amounts of computational time.
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CHAPTER V
MODELING THE IMPACT OF OVERCURRENT ON
RELIABILITY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
In this chapter we develop a theory that will help analyze impacts of fault currents on
reliability and asset management. As noted earlier there are few works done on impacts of
over-currents on reliability. However, these studies have not gone beyond the conceptual
phase and no studies have developed the topic to analyze the direct impact of fault currents
on system reliability. The main focus of the current reliability calculations are solely based
on statistical values and not electrical parameters. In this context, reliability of an electrical
power system is evaluated in the same exact way as the reliability of an urban logistics
system. Reliability indices calculated in such a framework will only reflect the general
ability of the system to deliver its defined tasks, and will not allow to model the direct
impact of electrical variables on the system reliability indices. Author sincerely believes
the work that is reported in this dissertation would be the first that brings the “relationship
between electrical variables such as current and the reliability indices to a new level.
Modeling the Effects of Overcurrent on Component Failure Rates
A huge short circuit current can cause a component to fail by exceeding its strength value
in a short period of time. A long duration overload condition can also cause the component
to fail by eventually exceeding the strength of the component as shown later in Figure 71.
Although short circuits and overloads are two distinct physical phenomena, having
different causes and effects, their deteriorating effects can both be described using the
model proposed later in this chapter. As such, henceforth in this document both events are
158

referred to as abnormal or overcurrent. However, when a short circuit is mentioned, a
higher current in a shorter period of time is meant as opposed to an overload that would be
a lower current over a longer period of time.
Overconsumption of electricity by users, especially during peak hours can be another
reason for having larger than intended currents through conductors that would shorten the
useful lives of electrical components, by having continuous exposure to higher than
designed electrical and mechanical stresses. In order to avoid these consequences, utilities
advise demand response programs for their customers that will incentivize customers for
reducing their consumption in certain times or through certain patterns. Chapter seven of
this document will study the impact of these demand response programs on asset
management, useful lifetime and maintenance planning of electrical components.
In a power system, over-currents occur at intermittent intervals and the likelihood that an
exposed component fails increases during the exposure time. In order to model the effect
of these occurrences, a model similar to the one used for adverse weather conditions can
be used [14].
Data on overcurrent (short circuits or overloads) collected from event recorders over a
period of time would produce a chronological variation as shown in Figure 68.
If the failure rate of an arbitrary component during normal conditions is  , then during
abnormal conditions, its failure rate changes to   which is clearly greater than  . The
average failure rate of this component, ̂ , can then be derived as follows:
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Figure 68. Chronological diagram of normal and faulty conditions.

Figure 69. Average profile for normal-faulty conditions

ˆ 

N
S


SN
SN

(60)

Where N   ni / T is the expected duration of normal conditions and S   si / T is the
i

i

expected duration of abnormal conditions. ni and s i are as shown in Figure 68. In this way,
the average profile could be as shown in Figure 69.
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Derivation of the model
It is clear that as the current through a component increases during the abnormal time
intervals S , the failure rate of the component, 𝜆, would also increase, 𝜆′ , and the component
will be more likely to fail. In order to model the behavior of a component under abnormal
conditions, it is helpful to study the strength pattern of the component. Suppose J is the
maximum tolerable current that can pass through the component. This J represents the
strength of the component against over-currents and is therefore designated as the “strength
current”. If I is the actual flowing overcurrent, the component endures as long as J  I .
The strength current J depends on various factors and it changes over time due to aging.
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider J as a random variable and that its average value
and variance change over time to account for component deterioration.
There are a number of statistical distribution functions that can be used to model the
behavior of J [91]. In this document, a Rayleigh distribution is used to model the strength
current J (maximum tolerable current) of the component as shown in Figure 70. This
current could be broken into its active and reactive elements, each following a normal
distribution as considered in standard stress and strength literature [91]. As a result, the
absolute value of J , i.e., the magnitude of the current strength, would follow a Rayleigh
distribution [91], [3] and [92]. This distribution function has been used in many relevant
documented studies in the literature and has the advantage of not sliding over into the
negative side of the strength region [91] and [3].
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f ( J )  k .J .e  kJ

f (J )
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2

/2

J

k

Figure 70. Rayleigh model of strength current.

Let us assume that an overcurrent with a given magnitude of I occurs at t 0  0 and it lasts
for a duration of t . Component reliability at time t is the probability that the component
endures at time t :




R(t )  p( J  I )(t )   f ( J , t )dJ   k (t ).J .exp{I

I

k (t ).J 2
k (t ).I 2
}dJ  exp{}
2
2

(61)

In (61) k is the inverse of variance of the strength current and is assumed to be an
increasing function of time in order to model the deterioration of strength with time.
Specifically, k is allowed to vary exponentially with time as in (62) and shown in Figure
71.

k (t )  k1 .e k2t

(62)
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k (t )

k1e k 2t
k1

t

Figure 71. Growth of k with time

Substituting (62) in (61) yields:

k1e k2t I 2
R(t )  exp( 
).u (t )
2

(63)

where u (t ) in (63) is the unit step function and is used simply because there are no faults
when t  0 .
In a more general case, consider a component with a constant failure rate  is exposed to
an abnormal current at t  t 0 and the event lasts for at least t . R (t ) in (63) then implies
two probabilities: the probability that the component is healthy for t  t 0 , and the
probability that it remains healthy during the abnormal condition. The first probability is
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e   .t and the second one is the time-shift of (63) by t 0 . These two probabilities are

independent and hence:

R(t )  e t . exp{( 

k1e k2 (t t0 ) I 2
).u (t  t 0 )}
2

(64)

k1e k2 (t t0 ) I 2
).u (t  t 0 )}
2

(65)

Or:

R(t )  exp{t  (

t

Since R (t )  e



  ( ) d
0

t

R(t )  exp(   d
0

d

, we can rewrite (65) as:

{  (

k1e k2 ( t0 ) I 2
).u (  t 0 )}d
2

(66)

Therefore, in terms of failure rate  (t ) :

k1ek 2 (t t 0 ) I 2
k1k2ek 2 (t t 0 ) I 2
 (t )    (
). (t  t0 )  (
).u (t  t0 )
2
2
Where

 (t  t 0 )

is an impulse function starting at t 0 .

Since in general f (t ). (t  t 0 )  f (t 0 ). (t  t 0 ) , (67) can then be rewritten as:
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(67)

k1I 2
k1k2ek 2 (t t 0 ) I 2
 (t )    (
). (t  t0 )  (
).u (t  t0 )
2
2

(68)

In (68) the time varying part of failure rate which is caused by the abnormal current is 𝜆′
as denoted in Figure 68 and Equation (60).
Equation (68) shows that the effect of abnormal current I is twofold: a rapid impact in the
form of the impulse function at the beginning of the fault; and an exponentially increasing
impact as to the third term of (9). The impulse function simulates the component failure at
the very beginning of the abnormal current and could be neglected if we discard the initial
failures.
Figure 72 shows a conceptual pictorial representation of (68). As seen in this figure, this
behavior is similar to the simple model of Figure 68 or Figure 69.

Figure 72. Plot of 𝜆(𝑡) versus time for an abnormal current situation starting at 𝑡0
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Equation (68) shows that failure rate during the abnormal current condition S is
proportional to the square of the abnormal current I . Therefore in Equation (60), although

S is generally of a very short duration compared to N , severe fault currents would highly
increase the failure rate during fault conditions. This indicates that the contribution of the
second term in Equation (60) can be considerable.
Markov Model Considering Overcurrent States
Here we develop a Markov Model to find various reliability indices of the component
considering over-currents in the system.
Figure 73 shows a proposed Markov model for calculating preventive maintenance cycles.
In this figure F is the component failure state and f is the state where there is an overcurrent
condition in the system. States 𝐷0 through 𝐷𝐹 are the component normal state and the
various deterioration levels, respectively. 𝐷𝐹 is when the component stops functioning as
a result of continues deterioration, and it should be brought to maintenance. PM, the
minimal preventive maintenance state, is assumed to bring the component back to the
previous deteriorated condition.
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Figure 73. Markov Model for preventive maintenance considering system faults.
At state f, the component is exposed to an extra stress resulting from the overcurrent
condition that has occurred in the system and the failure rate of the component in this period
is   . Once in state f, the component can either fail and enter the failure state F, or its health
condition further deteriorates and goes down one more level into the next deteriorating
state (Figure 73). These events are shown with transition rates 𝜆′ and 𝜆𝑓𝐷 , respectively.
According to [3], transition rates 𝜆′ and 𝜆𝑓𝐷 can be defined as follows:

𝜆′ =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓

And

𝜆𝑓𝑑 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓
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Therefore, the probability that the component fails (as opposed to being deteriorated) as
the result of a system overcurrent is:

𝜆′

𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 𝜆′ +𝜆

(69)

𝑓𝐷

The value of probability 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 can be obtained from the operation history of the component
as:

P𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 =

Pfail

Number of component failures as a result of system overcurrent
Number of overcurrents in the sytem under study

can then be plugged into (69) to get the value of  fD .

The following points should be noted in calculating   for the Markov model:
1- Instantaneous failure of components as a result of abnormal currents are
disregarded in this analysis. This is mainly because we are interested in the noninstantaneous impacts of abnormal currents that develop with time. Instantaneous
failures are the results of an imperfect design, or are due to an improper testing
procedure, etc. Thus, the impulse term in (68) is omitted here.
2- The time dependent portion of Equation (68),   , is considered in two ways: using
an approximate model and an average model.
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In the approximate model, the value of   during an abnormal current is assumed
to be constant. This constant value is obtained from (68) by setting t  t 0 in the
third term as follows:
𝜆′ =

𝑘1 𝑘2 2
𝐼
2

(70)

In the average model, however, the average value of   during a fault is calculated
by integrating the third term in (68) over the abnormal current interval:
1

𝑡 +𝜖 𝑘1 𝑘2

𝜆′𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 𝜖 ∫𝑡 𝑖
𝑖

2

𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡𝑖 ) . 𝐼 2 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1

𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 −1
2𝜖

. 𝐼2

(71)

where
t i is the instant when abnormal current occurs

𝜖 is the duration of the abnormal current

k1 , k 2

are the strength current constants

The average value of the failure rate given in (71), is believed to be a reasonable choice
   ( t ) dt
because the relation R(t )  e
shows that two systems with the same value of

  (t)dt will have the same reliability values.

169

The difference between the approximate and the average models (i.e., 𝜆′𝑖 and 𝜆′𝑎𝑣𝑒,𝑖 )
increases with length of interval 𝜖𝑖 of the abnormal current as shown later in the current
document.
The average outage duration r for the Markov model shown in Figure 73 is calculated
using (72). In (72), the numerator is the cumulative probability of failure and the
denominator is the cumulative frequency of failure [3] :
3

r

 PM
i 1

i

 PF  PDF

i1 PM i .P  ( PF  PDF ).
3

(72)

In this equation, variables used are as below:
𝑃𝑀𝑖 : Probability of residing in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ preventive maintenance state
𝑃𝐹 : Probability of the component failure state
𝑃𝐷𝐹 : Probability of state 𝐷𝐹
𝜇𝑃 : Repair rate from preventive maintenance states
𝜇: Repair rate from state 𝐷𝐹
Study Results Using the Markov Model
In what follows, various simulation case studies are conducted using the proposed Markov
model to examine the variation of component outage duration r with respect to various
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abnormal current parameters. First, the overload impacts are studied followed by that of
short circuits.
As an example, assume that the average failure rate of a component is   0.01f/yr and its
repair lasts for 12.5 hours. Furthermore, assume that accelerated lifetime tests have shown
that k1  0.4 in the strength current model of the component. The value of

k2

and other

parameters are specified for each of the simulation case studies as discussed below.
Variation of outage time with overloads.
In this and the next simulation study, state 𝑓 of the Markov model is considered to be an
overload condition. In addition to the above parameter values, other parameter values used
in this study are:

k 2  0.08
 f  1 (occ/yr) ,

  200 (occ/yr)
Varying the overload duration from 100 msec to 20 days, the average outage duration r is
calculated and the results are shown in Figure 74. In this study, the approximate value of
failure rate   during the overload condition is calculated using Equation (70). The study
is repeated for three different values of the overload current I; i.e., 1.5, 1.7, and 2 p.u. It
can be seen from the results in Figure 74 that the average outage duration r increases as
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the duration of overload increases. The curve starts from an outage duration of 12.514
hours when no overload occurs. It can be seen from the results that both magnitude and
duration of the overload current have considerable effects on the component outage time.

Figure 74. Variation of outage duration with duration of the overload current values of
Case1: 1.5 p.u., Case2: 1.7 p.u., and Case3: 2 p.u..
Variation of outage time with strength deterioration.
As shown in Figure 71, k 2 is a parameter of the strength current model that defines the
time constant of the component strength deterioration. A large value of k 2 indicates that
the component strength deteriorates rapidly and the component is more likely to fail due to
over-currents. Simulation studies were conducted with both average and approximate
models of   given by (70) and (71). The results are presented in Figure 75 for different
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values of k 2 . In these studies, the overload current is set at 1.5 p.u. Other parameters have
similar values as those in the previous study.

Figure 75. Variation of outage duration versus duration of the overload current for the
approximate model (x1, x3, x5, x7, x9) and the average model (x2, x4, x6, x8, x10).
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It can be seen from Figure 75 that for a given value of k 2 , the difference between the two
models increases with the overload duration. This is clearly shown in Figure 76 where the
plots of differences of the two models versus the overload duration are shown.

Figure 76. : Differences between two models of Figure 75 versus the overload duration.
These results make sense because when the overload duration is long, the increase in  
over time would be considerable (Figure 72). This means that it is not justified to consider

  as a constant during the whole duration of the overload condition. It is also seen that
the difference between the two models increases when k 2 increases. This is because larger
values of k 2 indicate that the system is strongly time dependent and hence assuming a
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constant value for   is actually inaccurate. Furthermore, it could easily be shown that if

k 2 or 𝜖 (duration of the overload) in (71) is sufficiently small, then using a Taylor series
expansion and neglecting the higher order terms would yield:

2 2

𝑘1

𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 −1
2𝜖

𝑘 𝜖
(1+𝑘2 𝜖+ 2 +⋯ )−1

. 𝐼 2 ≈ 𝑘1 {

2!

2𝜖

. 𝐼2} ≈

𝑘1 𝑘2
2

. 𝐼2

(73)

This shows that the approximate and the average models of   are almost identical.
The differences, however, are negligible in practice and therefore the approximate model
serves well, particularly in case of over-currents that have short durations. If a high
accuracy is required, on the other hand, an accurate time model should be used for long
overload durations.
Variation of outage duration with short circuit rate.
In this study and the next one, state 𝑓 of the Markov model is now considered to be the
short circuit state instead of the overload state as in the above studies and that it lasts for
100 msec. Other parameters used in this study are as follows:

k2  2
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I f  2 p.u.

  200 (occ/yr)
The rate of the short circuit state f,  f , is varied from 1 to 7 “occ/yr” and the impact on
outage duration r is studied. The results are shown in Figure 77. For this study, the
approximate model of   in (70) is used for simplicity. It can be seen from Figure 77 that
rate of the short circuit has little effect on the outage duration.

Figure 77. Variation of outage time versus short circuit rate.

Figure 78 shows the component outage time versus the component maintenance rate for
various short circuit levels. It can be seen from Figure 78 that if repair is performed more
frequently, then the outage time will be reduced. This reduction is mainly affected by the
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maintenance frequency and the short circuit level doesn’t play a significant role at the
beginning. But as the short circuit level increases higher than a critical value, the
maintenance program should be updated to adjust for the short circuit effects. For high
short circuit levels, a scheduled maintenance would result in lower-than-expected outage
reductions and thus the schedule must be updated accordingly.

Figure 78. Variation of outage time with maintenance rate for short circuit levels of
2,5,10,15,20,25 (from bottom to top).

Preventive maintenance scheduling
Existing methods of maintenance scheduling can be classified into several categories. First
group includes those based on heuristic methods, which provide the most primitive solution
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using trial-and-error principles [93] [94] [95]. Second category is based on artificial
intelligence (AI) methods [96] [97] [98] which include expert systems, simulated
annealing, fuzzy theory, genetic algorithms, and various other combinations of AI methods.
AI techniques have the capability of dealing with multi-objective requirements. However,
the expert systems approach is difficult to generalize since an inference engine must be
designed according to the particular characteristics of a designated problem. None of these
methods can be generalized to give an applicable general practice, due to large number of
parameters and variables required, and the fact that large portion of the techniques are
configured according to the specific requirements of the specific designated power system
[99]. Another major problem with all of these techniques is that they deal with maintenance
of electrical components as a general engineering challenge and none of them treat it in the
context of electrical parameters such as overcurrent levels. Although there is a general
agreement that mathematical models provide more reliable and versatile solutions to
maintenance scheduling, to the best of authors’ knowledge there is no analytical methods
that address the impact of overcurrent on reliability functions and therefore on maintenance
scheduling [100].
Equation (68) gives an expression for the failure rate and Figure 72 shows the failure rate
versus time, which is repeated here again in Figure 79 for easy reference.
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Figure 79. Plot of 𝜆(𝑡) versus time for an abnormal current situation starting at 𝑡0
The average failure rate can be calculated by integrating this curve over a time period as
follows (𝜖 is duration of overcurrent, 𝑡0 is when the fault occurs, and assume T=1 year for
simplicity):
T

1

𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒 = T ∫0 [𝜆 + (

𝑘1 𝐼 2
2

) . 𝛿(𝑡 − 𝑡0 ) +

𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝐼 2
2

𝑢(𝑡 − 𝑡0 )] 𝑑𝑡

(74)

Since the second term exists only around 𝑡0 and the third term exists within the fault
period; i.e. 𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖 (Consider T = 1)
𝑡
1 𝑘1 𝐼 2
) ∫𝑡 0+ 𝛿 (𝑡
T
2
0−

𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 𝜆 + (
𝑡0 +𝜖
𝑡0

[

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝐼 2
2

1

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 𝐼 2

]=𝜆+(

𝑡

𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝐼 2

0

2

− 𝑡0 )𝑑𝑡 + ∫𝑡 0+𝜖
T

2

)

𝑑𝑡 = 𝜆 + (

𝑘1 𝐼 2
2

)+
(75)

Therefore:

𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 𝜆 + (

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 𝐼 2
2

)

(76)
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(76) shows that impact of a single overcurrent is an increase in the average value of the
𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 𝐼 2

failure rate by (

2

).

For several overcurrent faults with values of 𝐼1 , 𝐼2 , …, 𝐼𝑛 occurring at times 𝑡01 , 𝑡02 ,
…𝑡0𝑛 with durations of 𝜖1 , 𝜖2 , …., 𝜖𝑛 , respectively, the average failure rate will be:
𝜆,

𝑡 < 𝑡01
𝜆+(

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖 𝐼 2

𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 𝜆 + (𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2𝜖1 𝐼2 ) + (
2
{

𝜆 + ∑𝑛𝑖=1

), 𝑡

01
2
𝑘
𝜖
2
2
2
𝑘1 𝑒
𝐼
2

< 𝑡 < 𝑡02

) , 𝑡02 < 𝑡 < 𝑡03

(77)

…

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 𝜖𝑛 𝐼 2
2

, 𝑡0𝑛 < 𝑡

Figure 80 shows the average failure rate in the presence of several overcurrent events
occurring in the system based on (77).

Figure 80. Average failure rate versus overcurrent events.
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With the average failure rate as shown in Figure 80, we can calculate the reliability function
for different time sections of the curve as follows.
𝑡

For 𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖 (during fault), using 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒 − ∫0 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 and Equation (68) for 𝜆(𝑡),
we can write:
𝑡

𝑡

𝑘1 𝐼 2
) . 𝛿(𝑡
2

𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒 − ∫0 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝{− ∫0 [𝜆 + (

− 𝑡0 ) +

𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2(𝑡−𝑡0) 𝐼2
𝑢(𝑡
2

− 𝑡0 )] 𝑑𝑡}

(78)

Since the second term exists only around 𝑡0 and the third term exists between 𝑡0 and 𝑡:

𝑅(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(−𝜆𝑡 − (

𝐸𝑥𝑝 [−𝜆𝑡 −

𝑘1 𝐼 2
2

𝑡

𝑡 𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝐼 2

0−

0

) ∫𝑡 0+ 𝛿 (𝑡 − 𝑡0 ) − ∫𝑡

𝑘
𝑘1 𝑒 2(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 2
𝐼 𝑢(𝑡
2

2

= 𝐸𝑥𝑝 [−𝜆𝑡 − (

𝑘1 𝐼 2
2

𝑡

)− [

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 (𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝐼 2

𝑡0

2

]] =

− 𝑡0 )]

(79)
Which is the same as Equation (65).
𝑡

For the period after fault; i.e. 𝑡0 + 𝜖 < 𝑡 using 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒 − ∫0 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 and Equation (68) for
𝜆(𝑡) , we have:
𝑡

𝑡

𝑘1 𝐼 2
) . 𝛿(𝑡
2

𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒 − ∫0 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝{− ∫0 [𝜆 + (

− 𝑡0 ) +

𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2(𝑡−𝑡0) 𝐼2
𝑢(𝑡
2

− 𝑡0 )] 𝑑𝑡}

(79)

Since the second term exists only around 𝑡0 and the third term exists between 𝑡0 and 𝑡0 +
𝜖 (as seen in Figure 79)
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𝑡
𝑘1 𝐼 2
) ∫𝑡 0+ 𝛿 (𝑡
2
0−

𝑅(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 {−𝜆𝑡 − (

𝑡 +𝜖 𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑒 𝑘2(𝑡−𝑡0) 𝐼2

− 𝑡0 ) − ∫𝑡 0
0

𝑡0 +𝜖
𝑘1 𝐼 2
𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2(𝑡−𝑡0) 𝐼2
)
−
[
]}
2
2
𝑡0

= 𝐸𝑥𝑝 {−𝜆𝑡 − (

2

= 𝐸𝑥𝑝{−𝜆𝑡 −

}=

𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2𝜖 2
𝐼 }
2

(80)

In summary, reliability function can be illustrated as below:

𝑒 −𝜆𝑡
𝑅(𝑡) =

𝑒
{

𝑒

𝑘
𝑘 𝑒 2(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 2
−𝜆𝑡− 1
𝐼 𝑢(𝑡−𝑡0 )
2

𝑘 𝑒𝑘2𝜖 2
−𝜆𝑡− 1
𝐼
2

𝑡 < 𝑡0
𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖

(81)

𝑡0 + 𝜖 < 𝑡

Figure 81 shows the reliability 𝑅(𝑡) of a component with two overcurrent events at t=1 and
t=2 based on equation (81). Both Figures 80 and 81 illustrate how failure rate and system
reliability are influenced by occurrences of faults and can be used to develop schedules for
preventive maintenance.

Figure 81. Reliability in the presence of two overcurrent events.
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Figure 82 assumes that preventive maintenance is done at interval 𝑇 on the component
shown in Figure 80. As seen from Figure 82, preventive maintenance is assumed to bring
the component back to the as-good-as new state. Maintenance interval 𝑇 can be determined
based on the maximum allowable value of the failure rate or the desired targeted value of
reliability [101]. Knowing the average values and the number of overcurrent events in a
system throughout the year, one can point out the approximate curve for 𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒 using (77)
and then preventive maintenance can be scheduled based on the targeted value of reliability
or failure rate to bring the components back to their as-good-as new states in intervals 𝑇
[102] and [103].

Figure 82. Impact of short circuits/overloads on failure rate and preventive maintenance
scheduling.
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CHAPTER VI: IMPACT OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FAULT
CURRENT LIMITERS ON ASSET MANAGEMENT
In this chapter, we study the impact of protection devices and fault current limiters (FCL’s)
on asset management in a substation in the North American electric network that has
installed a superconducting fault current limiter (SFCL). The SFCL installed in this
substation is a matrix fault current limiter (MFCL) type, described in Chapter 2. This
application was studied in detail in Chapter 4 where impacts of installed MFCL in
preventing load point outages were calculated and analyzed. As noted earlier, positive
impacts of FCL devices is not limited to outage prevention. In this chapter we use our
developed model to address the more important role of FCL’s in limiting the fault current,
and quantifying their impact on valuable assets in electric networks. For the sake of
comparison, we study the impact of the installed MFCL on asset management in the
presence of several different protection schemes, and compare it with the case without
MFCL and other types of superconducting/non-superconducting FCL’s.
Figure 83 shows a on-line diagram of a real substation in the US with SFCL installed. As
noted in Chapter 4, the installation of SFCL is intended to minimize the contribution of
transformer 𝑇3 to the fault current. This was due to the fact that the extra fault duty from
transformer 𝑇3 would put some of the breakers in a situation of not being able to break the
current safely. Installment of the MFCL in series with transformer 𝑇3 , as shown
numerically prevents a portion of load point outages, and reduces the potential of unstable
system operations. Fault current limitation, on the other hand, will reduce the stress on the
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power system elements in fault instances, therefore preventing their exposure to future
faults which would manifest themselves in their failure rates being inhibited from
increasing. We will here deal with this aspect of the FCL, and quantify the impact of this
device on failure rates of the substation elements.

Figure 83. Electric Substation in the USA with SFCL installed [24].

Calculating the Impact of Protection Devices and FCL on Failure Rates
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In order to perform the calculations, two possibilities have been considered for the fault in
the substation:
F1 : short circuit in the secondary side of the transformer 𝑇3 . This could be anywhere in
the bus bar, circuit breakers, or outgoing lines. The main current passing through
transformer 𝑇3 in this case is the transformer short circuit current which is determined from
the transformer per-unit linkage impedance [104].
F2: This shows a fault in the primary circuit of transformer 𝑇3 . In case of a short circuit in
primary side of transformer𝑇3 , the transformer does not have a major contribution to the
fault. The major contributions to the fault current come from other sources such as
transformer 𝑇4 , other substations, and the generating unit 𝐺5 . Calculating the short circuit
current for this type of faults, is harder than previous case due to lack of exact data about
specifications of transformer 𝑇4 and unit 𝐺5 . However, the probability of this type of fault
is much smaller than the first type since substations are normally considered as protected
areas and are much less likely to be faulty compared to case F1 that can present any fault
on any of the transmission lines. To calculate the fault current in this case, typical per unit
values were assumed for transformer 𝑇4 and unit 𝐺5 . Considering that similar machines
usually have parameters with same typical per-unit values, this assumption will generate
reasonably accurate results especially given the low probability of these types of faults
[104].
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In general, if a fault occurs at locations 𝐴𝑖 in the system, and the fault current that passes
𝑗

through device 𝑗 in this case is 𝐼𝑖 , the average increase in failure rate of device 𝑗 is as
below:

𝑗

∆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 ∈𝑖

𝑗

(𝐼𝑖 )2

(82)

2

𝑗

∈𝑖 is the duration of the fault current 𝐼𝑖 , and can be calculated from the fault clearance time
of the protection system. 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are strength parameters of the component 𝑗 in the power
system.
If the rate of fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 can be shown with 𝜆𝐴𝑖 , the average increase in failure rate of
𝑗

the component 𝑗 over time interval 𝑇 , ∆𝜆 𝑇 can be calculated as follows:
𝑗

𝑗

∆𝜆 𝑇 = ∑𝑖 𝜆𝐴𝑖 . 𝑇. ∆𝜆𝑖 = ∑𝑖 𝜆𝐴𝑖 . 𝑇. 𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 ∈𝑖

𝑗

(𝐼𝑖 )2
2

(83)

There are various elements and causes resulting in a fault in a given zone; for example for
the fault F1 in above the reasons could be faults in any of the circuit breakers, faults in any
of the lines, a fault in the secondary winding of transformer 𝑇3 etc. If we assume these
faults are independent of each other, the failure rate 𝜆𝐴𝑖 can be expressed as follows:
𝜆𝐴𝑖 = ∑𝑘 𝜆𝐴𝑖,𝑘

(84)

Where 𝜆𝐴𝑖,𝑘 is the rate of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ event that causes a fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 . Substituting (84) into
(83) yields:
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𝑗

∆𝜆 𝑇 = 𝑇 ∑𝑖 ∑𝑘 𝜆𝐴𝑖,𝑘 𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 ∈𝑖

𝑗

(𝐼𝑖 )2

(85)

2

With the FCL installed in the system, fault current form the fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 will change to
𝑗

𝐼𝑖,𝐹𝐶𝐿 . Therefore the average increase in the failure rate of component 𝑗 in the presence of
FCL (over time interval 𝑇) will be:

𝑗
∆𝜆 𝑇,𝐹𝐶𝐿

𝑗

= 𝑇 ∑𝑖 ∑𝑘 𝜆𝐴𝑖,𝑘 𝑘1 𝑒 𝑘2 ∈𝑖

(𝐼𝑖,𝐹𝐶𝐿 )2

(86)

2

In order to calculate ∈𝑖 or the fault duration in zone 𝐴𝑖 , we need to use results from security
analysis of protection systems in the previous chapters. It is assumed that a protection
system will be in one of the following modes at any given time [69]:

S

Protection succeeds to clear the internal fault (instantaneous)

F

Protection fails to clear the internal fault (protection not healthy while needed
to operate)

SB

Protection operates correctly to block the over-tripping during an external
fault. (Does not work when it is not required)

MF

Protection malfunctions (protection operated incorrectly)

SN

Protection is healthy but not required to operate

FN

Protection is not healthy while not required to operate
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SD Protection succeeds to clear the fault but after a time delay (clearing is not
instantaneous)
If a fault occurs within zones of protection, protection system can only be in one of the
states: 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷. 𝑇𝑆 , 𝑇𝐹 , and 𝑇𝑆𝐷 are the clearing times associated with these states,
respectively. 𝑇𝑆 is the clearance time when the protection system can successfully clear the
fault with no delay. 𝑇𝐹 is the clearance time when protection system completely fails to
clear the fault in the determined time frame, and therefore encounter the much bigger delay
of the back-up protection system Finally. Finally, 𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the clearance time of the protection
system when protection system fails to clear the fault instantly and there is a time delay of
zone two involved. 𝑇𝐹 is a much longer time period compared to the other two and can
cause instability and potential cascading failures. Therefore it is not normally desired for
protection systems to be in state 𝐹.The expected clearing time for the protection system
would be:
∈𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 (𝑆). 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑃𝑖 (𝐹). 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑃𝑖 (𝑆𝐷). 𝑇𝑆𝐷

(87)

Where 𝑃𝑖 (𝑆), 𝑃𝑖 (𝐹), and 𝑃𝑖 (𝑆𝐷) are probabilities of the protection system residing in
corresponding states for a fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 . We assume that the substation shown in Figure
83 is equipped with pilot protection scheme (described in Chapter 3) for protection of the
incoming/outgoing lines. Therefore, we use the results of the calculation performed in
Chapter 3 to find probabilities of the protection system residing in each of the above states.
In order to be able to compare the effects of adding redundancy to specific parts of the pilot
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protection system, as well as using different media for communication, the following
configurations have been considered and studied for each pilot scheme:


Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel



Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)



Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic)



Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic)



Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW)



Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line)

Figure 84 shows the increase in failure rate of transformer 𝑇3 without and with various type
FCL’s in 50 years (which is average life time of a power transformer [105] ) in the presence
of various arrangements of the PUTT protection scheme. Model parameters for a power
transformer have been selected to fit the failure data over a 50 year lifetime of power
transformers [105] .
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Figure 84. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for PUTT Scheme
arrangements:
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW)
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone)
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic)
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber)
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone)
As seen in this figure, without FCL, there will be a huge increase in failure rate of the
transformer. As matter of fact, without the FCL in the arrangement, the failure rate of the
transformer will reach an unacceptable level within a small fraction of this time.
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To see the difference in various arrangements of the PUTT scheme better, Figure 85 shows
the increase in failure rates of transformer 𝑇3 for various arrangements and without the
FCL.

f/yr
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Figure 85. Increase in failure rate without FCL for various PUTT Scheme arrangements.
Figure 86 shows the same data for case of resistive SFCL.
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Figure 86. Increase in failure rate in presence of resistive SFCL for various PUTT
Scheme arrangements.
Figure 87 shows the increment in failure rate for various types of FCL’s and the single
relay/single channel PUTT scheme.

193

Increment in Failure rate for Single Relay/Single
Channel
0.035
0.03

f/yr

0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
IS-Limiter

Resistive

DFCL

Saturated

SSCR

without FCL

Increase in Failure Rate

Figure 87. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for PUTT single
relay/single channel arrangements..

Figure 88 shows change in the average failure rate of transformer 𝑇3 during a one year
period, without FCL and in the presence of various types of FCL’s. As seen in this figure,
as FCL is being employed and the fault current limiting ratio increases, the role of
protection system and the fault clearance time type on increased failure rate becomes less
and less of an issue. This is clearly seen in the figure by comparing the slope of the line
from top to bottom for the case of without FCL with various FCL cases. This suggests
another added value for using FCL’s in the power network, in that it will eliminate the need
for accurate selection and setting of the protection system by making the entire system less
sensitive to the selection and setting process of the protection scheme.

194

Failure Rate of the transformer in a year
0.0057
0.0056
0.0055

Without FCL

f/yr

0.0054

DFCL

0.0053

Resistive SFCL

0.0052

Is-Limiter

0.0051

Saturated SFCL

0.005

SSCR

0.0049
0

20

40

60

80

100

Failure Rate

Figure 88. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with
different types of FCL.
Figure 89 illustrates the increase in failure rate of the transformer, with different types of
FCL’s and various arrangements of the DCB scheme.
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Figure 89. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for DCB Scheme
arrangements:
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW)
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone)
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic)
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber)
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone)

Figures 90 and 91 show the increase in failure rate without FCL and with the resistive
SFCL for various arrangements of the DCB scheme.
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Figure 90. Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCB Scheme arrangements.
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Figure 91. Increase in failure rate with resistive SFCL for various DCB Scheme
arrangements.
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Figure 92 compares the increment in failure rate for the single relay/single channel
arrangement of the DCB scheme, without FCL and in case of various types of FCL’s.

Increment in Failure rate for Single Relay/Single
Channel
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Figure 92. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCB single
relay/single channel arrangements.

From above figures, it is seen that for the DCB scheme there is generally a greater increase
in the failure rate values, but as before the role of FCL types and limitation ratio on limiting
the failure rate is incredible.
Figure 93 shows the sensitivity of failure rate for various combinations of the DCB system
arrangements and three types of FCL’s. This figure, again, confirms the positive impact of
FCL in reducing the sensitivity of failure rate to the protection scheme selection and
settings.
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Figure 93. Increase in failure rate for three type SFCL’s and various arrangements of the
DCB scheme:
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW)
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone)
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic)
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber)
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone)
Finally, Figure 94 shows the growth in the total failure rate of the transformer 𝑇3 for various
FCL types and single relay/single channel arrangement of the DCB scheme.
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Figure 94. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with
different types of FCL.

Figures 95 to 99 show the failure rate profiles for the DCUB scheme. These figures again
demonstrate the positive impact of FCL devices in limiting the failure rate values and also
in reducing the sensitivity of power system to the protection system performance.
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Figure 95. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for DCUB Scheme
arrangements:
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW)
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone)
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic)
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber)
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone)
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Figure 96. Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCUB Scheme arrangements.
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Figure 97. Increase in failure rate with resistive SFCL for various DCUB Scheme
arrangements.
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Figure 98. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCUB single
relay/single channel arrangements.
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Figure 99. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with
different types of FCL.
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CHAPTER VII
IMPACT OF DEMAND REPONSE PROGRAMS ON ASSET
Overloads in the forms of over-consumption, especially during peak hours, happen
frequently in power systems and will pose an extra burden on the power system equipment.
Demand response (DR) programs temporarily shifts customer energy load during peak
demand hours to off-peak periods, thus alleviating the load burden on the power grid during
high demand times. Reducing the peak energy demand not only allows more electricity to
be produced by cheaper base load generation but also saves the cost of building additional
power plants to meet the critical peak demand. Utility DR programs will also extend the
useful lifetime of power system assets by preventing them from carrying extra loads and
currents. In this chapter, in order to study the effects of DR programs on utility asset
management, at first DR programs are modelled and their impact on load pattern are
studied. Then, using the developed model in previous chapters, the impact of DR programs,
in terms of reducing the overload levels, on utility asset management plans is studied.
Introduction
The ongoing increases in the consumer demand profiles is stressing the aged electrical
network as governed by the increase in the System Average Interruption Duration Index
(SAIDI) and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). The increase in the
values of these indices is a result of the growing power complications like blackouts,
voltage sags and overloads which considerably lower the power quality and reliability. In
order to keep up with the increasing power demand, there is a need to supply electricity
more efficiently and reliably. Reducing losses through the generation, transmission and
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distribution networks and increasing the transmission capacity will certainly increase the
throughput of the current power system, minimizes or eliminates the requirement to build
new power plants and will give way to better and cleaner means to generate & transmit
electrical power. Reference [106] shows that creating more efficient end-use and reducing
consumption will cut generation capital investment by 28% to 35%.
Demand Side Management (DSM), also known as Energy Demand Management or Load
Management, entails utility actions that influence the patterns of use of energy consumed
by end users, such as actions targeting reduction of demand during peak periods or when
energy-supply systems are constrained. The relatively low utilization of generation and
networks means that there is a significant scope for DSM in contributing to increasing the
efficiency of the system investment. Several potential applications of DSM are [107]:
-Reducing the generation margin
-Improving transmission grid investment and operation efficiency
-Improving distribution network investment
-Managing demand–supply balance in systems with intermittent renewables
The term DSM encompasses several energy demand modification activities such as [108]:
Energy Efficiency
Energy Conservation: involves using less energy
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Demand response (DR): not necessarily reduction in usage but more likely shifting usage
to off-peak hours (and also Load building [109]).
Demand Response
Demand response is defined as: Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time,
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at time of high wholesale
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized [110]. In brief, DR is the change in
electricity consumption triggered by some utility actions in order to gain specific results.
Some benefits of DR programs include reduction of power overloads, bill savings for
customers, lower electricity wholesale market prices and reliability improvements in
electrical network ( [111] , [112] , [107] , [113] and [109] ). Utilities are using various
techniques to determine if consumers follow more intelligent energy consumption patterns.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) report entitled “Assessment of DR
and Advanced Metering” has found that only five percent of customers are on some form
of DR programs [114]. This is mainly due to the lack of proper models in this area that
could enable customers and utilities to unveil the strong potentials of these programs.
Experience indicates that DR programs are more effective when system wise indices and
parameters are involved and if no contradictory results appear. This is the case of DR
initiatives with the only aim of securing the system stability, which promotes load shifting
to periods of time when electricity tariffs are lower. However due to the lack of reliability
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targets and incentives, average energy consumption on yearly basis may increase due to
inefficient usage promoted by low rates during off-peak hours, that would in turn
deteriorate system reliability indices and margins [21].
There is a lack of an accurate model in the DR area that allows utilities to observe the
impact of various DR programs on system indices. Some literatures have made good
attempts in classifying DR programs and modeling each type, but they have assumed a
constant elasticity that can be inaccurate in predicting customer behaviors in reality [20].
In this chapter a new DR model is developed used that is completely consistent with the
demand-price curve and does not have the inaccuracies of the constant-elasticity model.
Using the new DR model, a control panel is developed that enables utilities to monitor and
simulate various DR programs in their service areas and view the results on the screen. It
also allows changing load combinations on various load buses and at different time of the
year to simulate the realistic situation of the system. Results would then allow for a proper
planning and utilization of available DR resources in a system based on system reliability
needs.
Having the system load profile in the presence of various DR programs, new levels of
system overloads can be calculated and used in the proposed mathematical model to
forecast the reliability improvements of DR programs.
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Demand Response Programs
Demand response programs are divided into two basic categories namely Time-Based Rate
Programs (TBRPs), and Incentive Based Programs (IBPs) [115]. Figure 100 shows this
classification.

Figure 100. Classification of DR programs.
In time-based rate programs, i.e., Time of Use (TOU), Real Time Pricing (RTP), and
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) programs, the electricity price changes for different periods
according to the electricity supply cost. TOU rates establish two or more daily periods that
reflect hours when the system load is higher (peak) or lower (off-peak), and charge a higher
rate during peak hours. RTP rates vary continuously during the day reflecting the wholesale
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price of electricity. CPP is an overlay on either TOU or flat pricing. CPP uses real-time
prices at times of extreme system peaks.
Incentive-based programs include Direct Load Control (DLC), Emergency Demand
Response Program (EDRP), Capacity Market Program (CAP), Interruptible/Curtailable
(I/C) service, Demand Bidding (DB), and Ancillary Service (A/S) program. These
programs can be classified into three main subgroups namely; voluntary, mandatory and
market clearing programs.
DLC and EDRP are voluntary programs which mean that if customers do not curtail
consumption, they are not penalized but they might lose some of the credits that they could
gain by fully participating in the program. DLC refers to a program in which a utility or
system operator remotely shuts down or cycles a customer’s electrical equipment on short
notice to address a system or local reliability issue. EDRP provides incentive payments to
customers for reducing their loads during reliability triggered events, but curtailment is
voluntary.
I/C and CAP are mandatory programs and participating customers are subject to penalties
if they do not curtail consumption when directed. Customers on I/C service rates receive a
rate discount or bill credit in exchange for agreeing to reduce load during system
contingencies. If customers do not curtail, they can be penalized. In CAP, customers
commit to provide pre-specified load reductions during system contingencies, and are
subject to penalties if they do not curtail consumption when directed.
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DB and A/S are market clearing programs, where large customers are encouraged to offer
or to provide load reductions at a price at which they are willing to be curtailed, or to
identify how much load they would be willing to curtail at posted prices. DB program
encourages large customers to offer load reductions at a price at which they are willing to
be curtailed, or to identify how much load they would be willing to curtail at posted prices.
A/S program allows customers to bid load curtailments in ISO markets as operating
reserves. If their bids are accepted, they are paid the market price for committing to be on
standby. If their load curtailments are needed, they are called by ISO, and may be paid the
spot market electricity price. More detailed explanations of various DR programs can be
found in [115].
Available DR Models
References [116] and [117] have studied the impact of several DSM (demand side
management) programs such as: peak clipping, load shifting and load addition on load
curve and reliability indices. The studied DSM programs encounter an addition or
subtraction of specific percentages of annual peak load to the base load. While this
representation of DSM is helpful for giving an estimation of the impact of DSM on power
system indices, it doesn’t give a realistic picture of the DSM programs because these
programs are usually known in terms of pricing and incentives rather than power
percentages. Moreover, these programs normally do not result in the addition or subtraction
of an exact power value to the load curve.
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At this point, it is helpful to review the important concept of price elasticity of demand in
the Demand Response terminology before presenting the new DR model.
Price Elasticity of Electrical Demand

Price elasticity of electrical demand is defined as the ratio of relative change in demand to
relative change in price [118].
d
d
E 0
p
p0

(88)

Where E is the price elasticity, Δd and Up are change in consumption and change in

electricity price, respectively and d0 and p0 are base consumtion and base electricity price,

respectively.
According to Eq.(88), the so called “cross-elasticity” of the ith period versus jth period can
be defined as:

Ei , j 

p0 ( j ) d (i )
.
d 0 (i ) p ( j )

(89)
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Now if d (i ) i  1,....24 is the change in demand in the ith hour and p (i ) i  1,....24 is
the change in price in the ith hour and Ei , j is cross elasticity values, for the complete pricedemand impacts we may write:

 d (1)   E1,1

 E
 d (2)   2,1
 .  .

 
 .   .
 d (24)   E

  24,1

E1,2

. .

E2,2

. .
. .
.

E24,2

. .

E1,24   p (1) 

E2,24   p (2) 


E3,24    . 
 

.   . 
E24,24   p (24) 

(90)

where
d (i )  fi ( p(1), p(2),..., p(24)) i  1,....24

(91)

and

Ei , j 

fi
p( j )

(92)

Models Using Elasticity of Demand
A model has been presented and studied in [119] for TOU and EDRP programs that is close
to what happens in reality. However, this model doesn’t consider the diversity of
customers. For example residential customers may have different reactions and preferences
to prices and incentives. For a comprehensive study of DR, the intended model should
consider the diversity and preferences of costumers and should respond differently when
the combination percentage of costumers in an area changes.
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References [20] and [120] have provided a good classification and modeling of various
types of DR, but they have assumed a constant elasticity; i.e., linear 𝑓𝑖 functions. This
might be helpful in simplifying the problem and giving general results but is not acceptable
for accurate studies. Another problem with the linear demand-price model is that when the
price approaches zero, it reaches a steady value and does not grow unlimitedly. Whilst in
reality, if the price of a commodity drops to zero, its demand will grow in a free market.
[121] has modified the constant-elasticity assumption by considering an elasticity that is
constant but that also changes depending on the spot price being considered. This approach
needs elasticity values to be recalculated for every change in the price and still has the
deficiency of considering a linear demand function in the first place.
New DR Model
[122] has assumed another shape for the demand function, f i , a trans-log function which
is more consistent with the real demand curve. This model doesn’t assume a simple linear
form for the f i function like before, and is widely considered in the economical modelling
of electricity demand ( [123], [124], [125], [126]). The model also considers other
parameters such as customer’s income and the price of natural gas in the formulation of
demand-price function. Equation (93) describes this model:
𝑙𝑛𝐷 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛𝑌 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃 + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃

(93)

where:
𝑙𝑛
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D is the electricity consumption

Y is the customer income

EP is the electricity price

GP is the price of a substitute good, that in this case is natural gas [127], [128], [129].

The above model is more consistent with demand-price behavior-especially in areas where
price goes towards zero- than the constant-elasticity model reported in the literature [20].
In this chapter this model has been adopted as a base in modeling the DR programs. In
using Equation (93) for this chapter, all parameters other than electricity price could be
assumed equal to their predetermined values, and hence demand would change only by
change in the electricity price. Values of the parameters used in this model are given in the
literature ( [123], [124], [125], [127]) for various countries including the US.
Modeling Demand Response including Penalties and Incentives
Suppose that the customer changes his demand from d 0 (i ) (initial value) to d (i ) (where i
could be the ith hour or ith period depending on the DR program type), based on the value
which is considered for the incentive and the penalty mentioned in the contract. The change
in demand is:
d (i)  d (i)  d0 (i)

(94)
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If $ A(i ) is paid as incentive to the customer for each kWh load reduction, the total
incentive for participating in the program will be as follows:
P(d (i ))  A(i ).[d 0 (i )  d (i )]

(95)

If the costumer doesn’t curtail or reduce its consumption as to the contract, it will be faced
with a penalty. If the agreed upon level of the contract is IC (i ) and the penalty is $ pen (i )
, then the total penalty, PEN (d (i )) can be calculated as:
PEN (d (i))  pen(i ).{IC (i)  [d0 (i)  d (i)]}

(96)

It is obvious that for DR programs without penalty, the value of the penalty function would
be set to zero.
Let’s assume that B ( d (i )) is the customer income of using d (i ) kWh electrical energy in
the considered period. The function that is most often used for this purpose is the quadratic
benefit function [130]:

 d (i )  d0 (i ) 

B(d (i ))  B0 (i )  0 (i ).[d (i )  d 0 (i )]. 1 

2 Ei ,i .d0 (i ) 




(97)

Where 𝜌 is the electricity price and the subscription “0” denotes values before applying
the DR program. The total benefit, S , of the customer in this interval would be :

S  B(d (i ))  d (i ). (i )  P(d (i ))  PEN (d (i ))
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(98)

It is assumed that customer tends to optimize its benefit. By differentiating the above
equation and setting it to zero, the costumer’s consumption will be as following:

[  (i)  0 (i)  A(i)  pen(i)] 
d (i )  d 0 (i ). 1  Ei ,i .

0 (i )



(99)

The above Equation gives the demand value in any interval, based on the features of a
given DR program, such as price, incentives and penalty values.
In Equation (99), it can be seen that if the electricity price does not change and the incentive
and the penalty are zero, then d (i ) will remain the same as the initial value of d 0 (i ) .
By extending the above concept to calculating the consumption in an interval when the
price changes in other intervals, using the cross elasticity values one can write:


[  (i )  0 (i )  A(i)  pen(i)] 24
[  ( j )   0 ( j )  A( j )  pen( j )] 

d (i )  d 0 (i ). 1  E (i, i ).
  E (i, j ).

0 (i )
0 ( j )
j 1


j i

 (100)

Representation of the load at each load bus.
The IEEE-Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) has been used extensively to develop and
illustrate composite system evaluations [131]. The load model information provided can
be used to calculate total system hourly loads for one complete year on a per unit basis,
expressed in a chronological fashion so that daily, weekly and seasonal patterns can be
developed. The system load is described by specifying the weekly peak loads in percent of
the annual peak load, the daily peak load in percent of the weekly peak load and the hourly
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peak load in percent of the daily peak load. A problem with this approach is that it doesn’t
consider that individual buses follow different load curves depending on the mix of
customers at that bus. A more comprehensive load model would recognize that individual
load buses have different load curves with respect to combination of customer classes at
that load bus.
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) has been used to identify seven types of
customer sectors [132].These sectors are as follows:


Large users,



Industrial,



Commercial,



Agricultural,



Residential,



Government & Institutions,



Office & Buildings

The assumed load profiles of these seven customer sectors for a typical day are shown in
Figures 101 through 103 [133] .
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Figure 101. Load profile for the Residential and Industrial Sectors..
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Figure 102. Load profile for the Commercial, Large Users and Agricultural Sectors.
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Figure 103. Load profile for the Government & Institution and Office & Building Sectors..
Reference [130] shows a method to calculate and illustrate chronological load curves of a
given bus depending on its combination of these seven sectors. In this method, load curve
of each sector is determined and combined to give the overall bus load curve. If 𝐿𝑗𝑖 is the
proportion of the sector peak load contributed by sector i during hour j, to the load at bus
k, the load at bus k, for hour j is given by Equation (101).

𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵𝑢𝑠 𝑘
Load at Bus k for hour j=∑𝐴𝑙𝑙
(𝐿𝑗𝑖 × 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ′ 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑠 𝑘) (101)
𝑖=1
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𝐿𝑗𝑖 is also referred to as the allocation factor. Tables 12 to 14 in Appendix of this document
gives the allocation factor of each sector depending on weak of the year, day of the week,
and time of the day.
DR Control Panel
To implement and test the developed model, the RBTS test system has been selected
because of its simplicity and its selection of parameters and values that can represent
various possible scenarios in a power system [134] , [135].
A single line diagram of the RBTS test system which shows the assigned load bus customer
compositions is shown in Figure 91. It can be seen from this figure that there are some
residential and commercial sector customers at every load bus. As an example, Bus 2 has
industrial, commercial, residential, and government and institutional users allotted to it.
The bus data and generator data of this system are given in Appendix of this document.
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Figure 104. Single line diagram of the RBTS with customer compositions.
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Using the approach outlined in previous section, load profiles have been developed for the
buses of the RBTS for all hours of the day, all days of the week and all weeks of the year.
The profiles are also calculated for every possible combination of the 7 major sectors of a
load: residential, commercial, office and buildings, governmental and institutions,
industrial, agricultural and large users. Table 12 shows the RBTS bus combinations (MW)
for each of the load sectors [130] .
Table 12. RBTS Bus Load Combinations (MW)
User Sector

Bus2

Bus3

Bus4

Bus5

Bus6

Large Users

---

55.5

--

--

--

Industrial

3.5

3.05

16.3

--

3.05

Commercial

3.75

4.7

4.7

3.7

1.7

Agricultural

--

--

--

--

7.4

Residential

7.25

19.90

19

8.9

7.85

Government
and
Institutions

5.55

--

--

5.55

--

Office and
Building

--

1.85

--

1.85

--

DR programs are modeled using Equation (100) and the elasticity model of Equation (90).
These models were integrated into the developed control panel shown in Figure 105. This
panel would allow the utilities to forecast consumption based on the time of the year and
load combination of each bus and see the results of implementing their various DR
programs.
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Figure 105. DR control panel showing loads on RBTS buses.
Table 13 shows various scenarios used to obtain the study results. In this table values of
incentives and penalties are stated in cents/kWh. The load curve is divided into three
different periods, namely low load period (00:00 am–9:00 am), off-peak period (9:00 am–
7:00 pm) and peak period (7:00 pm–12:00 pm).
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Table 13. Scenarios Used for Comparison
No.

Scenario

Color

1

Initial Load

Blue

2

3

4

Incentive 5 , penalty 5

Red

Incentive 5 , penalty 7

Cyan

Incentive 10 , penalty 5

Green

Figures 106 to 109 show the results of using DR programs on different load buses of the system under various
scenarios.

Figure 106. Load profile on Bus 2. Colors codes as defined in Table 13.
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Figure 107. Load profile on Bus 3. Colors codes as defined in Table 13.

Figure 108. Load profile on Bus 4. Colors codes as defined in Table 13.
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Figure 109. Load profile on Bus 5. Colors codes as defined in Table 13
It is seen in the figures that buses 2 and 5 which are more of residential nature are very
sensitive to incentive and penalty values. Improper selection of these values might result
in new peaks being created during the off-peak hours. Large loads (Bus 3), however, show
a more robust pattern and more advanced programs and studies should be in place to
effectively impress their patterns of consumption in a short run. This would highlight the
important role that customer types play in determining their response to the DR programs
and implies the need for models that tend to consider customer types when evaluating the
demand response characteristics.
Reliability Impacts of DR Programs
Using generated plots for each DR program, overloads in each bus were calculated. For
calculating the overload current from the consumption data given, electrical and statistical
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data given in Appendix of this document were used. It is assumed that overload percentage
on any single equipment at each bus is proportional to the total overload percentage on that
bus [136]. Based on the values of overload currents and associated time durations, failure
rate increases can be calculated for each case. Figure 110 below shows the failure rate
increase over time period of 50 years for various DR programs applied to the test system.
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Figure 110. Failure rate increase of transformer 𝑇3 over time period of 50 years for
various DR programs applied to the test system..
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation a new model was proposed and developed to study the impact of
overcurrent levels in power system reliability. This model will enable us to consider the
impact of various types of fault current limiting devices (FCL’s) from an angle that hasn’t
been seen or discussed before. Using the proposed model, impact of various types of FCL’s
and protection systems on failure rates were studied and compared. Current limiting
devices are mainly used to reduce short circuit stresses on components and the proposed
model allows to quantify this impact. These types of studies would assist utilities in their
long term plantings and asset management programs. Overload currents and utility
programs for reducing their impact, known as Demand Response (DR) programs, were also
modeled using this approach. Since overloads have less a sever role in causing power
system outages, their reliability impacts have been neglected in conventional outage-based
models reported in the literatures.
The author believes that continuation of line of study presented in this dissertation would
lead to new era of reliability evaluation of power systems using electrical parameters.
Novel reliability methods that use electrical parameters of the system, as opposed to the
merely statistical approaches, not only will give quicker and more accurate results, but will
enable analysis and decision making routines that commensurate with available electrical
parameters and measures of the electrical network. Some of the possibilities to continue
this work further are include but not limited to:
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1- Find parameters of the failure rate model presented in this dissertation from stressstrength and accelerated lifetime tests on any given equipment. The obtained
parameters can then be used to accurately model and schedule preventive
maintenance for that equipment.
2- Incorporate the electrical models of failure rates in various aspects of reliability
evaluations and compare the results with those from traditional models.
3- Perform security and dependability analysis for more types of protection systems
and compare their effects on failure rates based on their fault clearance times.
4- Find maintenance intervals for power system components based on magnitude and
duration of fault currents in that area. Fault current magnitudes and durations can
be found from historical data obtained from fault recorders in substations, or
calculated from short circuit analysis. Dependability/security analysis is also
required to find fault clearance times by the protection systems.
5- Use the model developed for failure rate in this dissertation to model other
reliability indices for a component such as MTTR, MTTF, unavailability, etc.
6- Study other methods of fault current reduction presented in chapter two and model
them using the developed approach. Pros and Cons of each method can be
calculated and compared and most efficient method introduced for each application.
7- In this dissertation, effects of fault currents as the dominant cause of components
failure, were modelled on reliability. Models can be developed to consider and
include other electrical parameters such as over-voltages. Although historically
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over-voltages are having a less important role in component deterioration especially in modern power systems with high standard on system grounding-, they
are still posing threats to insulations and material strengths causing undesired
effects that could result in damages.
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APPENDICES
Table1. Eliminated failure modes for Single Sectionalized bus arrangement

* Active Failure in component No.1: Short circuit in breaker No. 1
** Active failure in component No.13 and total failure in component No.1: Short circuit in component No. 13 and any failure (short
circuit or open circuit) in components No.1.
“S” is “stuck breaker” and denotes the event that a breaker doesn’t open when required.

Table2. Eliminated failure modes for Breaker and a Half
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Table3. Eliminated failure modes for Breaker and a Half

Table 4. Failure modes of main and transfer bus system

Failure Event

λ (f/yr)

r (hours)

U (hours/yr)

8

0.01

1

0.01

5+6

2.28311E-08

0.5

1.14155E-08

7+10

2.73973E-07

6

1.64384E-06

7+11

2.73973E-07

6

1.64384E-06

7+12

1.82648E-07

3

5.47945E-07

13

0.01

4

0.04

14

0.01

4

0.04

3A

0.005

1

0.005

5A

0.005

1

0.005

6A

0.005

1

0.005

7A

0.005

1

0.005

9A

0.005

1

0.005

10A

0.005

1

0.005

11A

0.005

1

0.005

4A+7

7.42009E-08

3

2.22603E-07

1A+6

1.14155E-08

0.8

9.13242E-09

2A+5

1.14155E-08

0.5

5.70776E-09

1A+7

7.42009E-08

0.92307692

6.84932E-08

3
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1A+11S
2A+6S

0.0005
0.0005

1
1

0.0005
0.0005

4A+9S

0.0005

1

0.0005

4A+11S

0.0005

1

0.0005

4A+10S

0.0005

1

0.0005

TOTAL

0.0675008

1.88893

0.127504153

Total with FCL1

0.0580009

2.03452

0.118004153

Total with FCL2

0.0575008

2.04352

0.117504153

0.0515008

2.16509

0.111504153

Total with FCL1
& FCL2

FCl1

FCL2

Table 5. Failure Modes of Single Sectionalized Bus Arrangement
Failure Rate (f/yr)
quipment

Open
Circuit

Short Circuit

Total

Repair Time (hrs)

Switching Time(hrs)

Power Transformer

0.015

0.02

0.035

55

1

Circuit Breaker

0.005

0.005

0.01

12

1

Disconnector Switch

0.005

0.005

0.01

4

1

Bus Bar

0.005

0.005

0.01

4

1

Failure Event

λ (f/yr)

r (hours)

U (hours/yr)

5

0.01

12

0.12

3

0.01

4

0.04

1+2

2.73973E-07

6

1.64384E-06

1+4

2.73973E-07

6

1.64384E-06

1A

0.005

1

0.005
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Pc

0.1

4A

0.005

1

0.005

6A+1

7.42009E-08

0.923076923

6.84932E-08

2A+4S

0.0005

1

0.0005

6A+4S

0.0005

1

0.0005

Total

0.031000622

5.516126591

0.171003356

Total with FCL

0.020000622

7.999918952

0.160003356

ΔI

ΔI

0.011

0.011

Table 6:Failure Modes of Breaker and a Half System
Failure Rate (f/yr)
Switching
Time(hrs)

0.03
5

55

1

0.005

0.01

12

1

0.005

0.005

0.01

4

1

0.005

0.005

0.01

4

1

Short Circuit

Tota
l

Power
Transformer

0.015

0.02

Circuit Breaker

0.005

Disconnector
Switch
Bus Bar

Equipment

Failure Event

λ (f/yr)

r (hours)

U (hours/yr)

11

0.01

4

0.04

8+6

2.73973E-07

6

1.64384E-06

10+6

1.82648E-07

3

5.47945E-07

1+2

9.13242E-08

2

1.82648E-07

6+9

2.73973E-07

6

6+7

2.73973E-07

6

6A

0.005

1
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0.005

Pc

0.
1

Load Point of Interest: L1

Repair Time (hrs)

Open
Circui
t

6A+2

2.85388E-08

0.8

2.28311E-08

6A+6aS

0.0005

1

0.0005

8A

0.005

1

0.005

1A+8

9.13242E-08

3

2.73973E-07

1A+10

4.56621E-08

2

9.13242E-08

1A+9

9.13242E-08

3

2.73973E-07

1A+7

9.13242E-08

3

2.73973E-07

2A+6

9.13242E-08

3

2.73973E-07

3A+2

2.85388E-08

0.8

2.28311E-08

3A+8

7.42009E-08

0.923076923

6.84932E-08

3A+10

2.85388E-08

0.8

2.28311E-08

3A+7

7.42009E-08

0.923076923

6.84932E-08

3A+9

7.42009E-08

0.923076923

6.84932E-08

4A+1

2.85388E-08

0.8

2.28311E-08

4A+6

7.42009E-08

0.923076923

6.84932E-08

7A+1

2.85388E-08

0.8

2.28311E-08

12A+6

9.13242E-08

3

2.73973E-07

1A+6S

0.0005

1

0.0005

3A+6S

0.0005

1

0.0005

3A+4S

0.0005

1

0.0005
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4A+3S

0.0005

1

0.0005

9A+8S

0.0005

1

0.0005

10A+8S

0.0005

1

0.0005

Total

0.023502038

2.276578078

0.053504224

Total with FCL1

0.018502066

2.621558372

0.048504247

ΔI

0.004999971

0.004999977

0.022502038

Total with FCL2
ΔI

2.333309743

0.052504224

0.001

Total with
FCL1&2

0.001

0.017502066

ΔI

2.714207912

0.005999971

0.047504247
0.005999977

Eliminated due to FCL1
When FCL1 is installed
Eliminated due to FCL2

Table 7: Electrical data of Sporn Substation

Transformer 𝑇3

Short

Customer

Circuit

Plant

Loads

Unit #5

Capacity
400 MVA, 345 𝑌 6200
kV/138 ∆ kV

MVA

50 MW

350

MW, Up to 450

Load factor MW
96%
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Table 8. Modes of operation for Sporn Substation
𝑇3

Current
FCL

through

Mode

Description

Transformer
status

1

Normal Operation:

Normal carrying
light load with
assistance from 𝑇4
and Unit #5

400 Arms

Unit #5 Generator
in service, 𝑇3 and
𝑇4 each carry light
load

2

Unit #5 Generator out of
service

Share load with 𝑇4

1250 Arms

𝑇3 and 𝑇4 share
load

3

Unit #5 Generator is
down and either T3 or T4
fails

Remaining
transformer will
provide all load

Up to 2300Arms
(if T4 fails)

4

Fault between FCL and 𝑇3

Close fault
Secondary
Transformer

26kArms

E/E3
Breakers
open and lock-out

5

Fault in 138kV system

Fault in Secondary
of Transformer

13.8kArams

Re-close scheme
employed –up to 4
re-close
with
possibility of stuck
breaker
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in
of

Details

Table 9: Electrical Data of the IEEE Reliability Test System: Generators
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Table 10: Electrical Data of the IEEE Reliability Test System: Buses
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Table 11: Electrical Data of the IEEE Reliability Test System: Lines
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Table 12. Hourly percentage of the sector peak load for all sectors
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Table 13: Daily percentage of the sector peak load

Table 14: Daily percentage of the sector peak load
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